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ABSTRACT 
 
The current study is a continuation on a line of research examining the effects of 
affective states on cognitions related to risky sexual behavior and is based on the 
Prototype/Willingness Model (Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, 2003). Past research (Pomery, 
2004) found that mood states had a greater influence on behavioral willingness (BW) to 
engage in risky sexual behavior than on behavioral intentions/expectations (BI/BE) to engage 
in risky sexual behavior. Negative affective states were associated with greater levels of 
willingness and positive affective states were associated with lower levels of willingness. 
The current study investigated the effects of happy, sad, and neutral mood states on positive 
and negative outcome expectancies and other risk cognitions (willingness, 
intentions/expectations, prototype images, perceived vulnerability). College students (N = 
110), who were pre-selected based on their prior high levels of willingness and either low or 
high levels of intentions, were randomly assigned to one of the three mood conditions 
(happy, sad, neutral). After the mood induction, participants were exposed to eight positive 
and eight negative outcome expectancies and their endorsements of these expectancies were 
measured, along with their response times. This was followed by the other risk cognition 
measures. It was hypothesized that those in the negative mood condition would more 
strongly endorse the positive outcome expectancies, as they would be motivated to improve 
their current mood state. In contrast, participants in the happy mood condition were expected 
to have lower levels of endorsement for the positive outcome expectancies. In addition, it 
was hypothesized that the effects of the induced mood states would be moderated by prior 
level of BW and BI, with those “at risk”  (high BW/low BI) showing stronger mood effects 
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than those more committed to the risky behavior (high BW/high BI). Contrary to 
expectations, no effects of mood were found on the endorsement of outcome expectancies in 
any of the repeated-measures analyses. When examining only the negative outcome 
expectancies, there were significant effects of mood on the “Would this be important to 
you?” item, though not as predicted. The negative outcome expectancies received the highest 
importance ratings from those who were in the happy mood condition and were higher in 
mass-testing BI/BE. There were few effects of mood on the positive outcome expectancy 
items. Not surprisingly, those in the high BW/high BI group (the “intenders”) showed greater 
endorsement of the positive outcome expectancies and lower endorsement of the negative 
outcome expectancies; these effects may be due to dissonance reduction. Contrary to 
predictions, however, when interactions were found, it was the high BW/high BI group that 
showed the stronger mood effects (“the intenders”). With respect to the response time 
measures, those in the happy mood condition with higher levels of prior BI/BE were quicker 
at reading the negative outcome expectancies; those in the sad condition took longer to report 
whether these expectancies either came to mind or were important to them. Those in the sad 
mood condition reported the highest levels of BW and BI/BE during the experimental 
session.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The average layperson is aware that emotions can influence their everyday judgment 
and decision-making (Wang, 2006), as exemplified in the phrase, “I’m too emotional to think 
straight.” However, the exact ways in which different affective states influence cognitions 
and behavior are more varied and complex (Pham, 2007) than the simplistic statement 
indicates. Likewise, the relation between mood and risk behavior has also failed to present a 
clear or consistent picture. On the one hand, one can speculate that positive moods should 
lead to increases in risky behaviors, as happy people tend to be more optimistic (Salovey, 
Detweiler, Steward, & Bedell, 2001), think less carefully about decisions (Mackie & Worth, 
1991), and are more likely to engage in approach behaviors (Eich & Forgas, 2003). On the 
other hand, it’s also possible that negative moods lead to more risky behaviors, as unhappy 
people tend to be willing to engage in potentially risky behavior to ameliorate their current 
affective state (Baumeister & Scher, 1988). The goal of the current study is to investigate the 
role of affect, both positive and negative, on health risk cognitions. First, the literature on 
affect and information-processing will be reviewed. Second, specific studies regarding affect 
and risk decision-making will be discussed. Then the research will be applied to elements of 
the Prototype/Willingness model, a model of health risk behavior. 
Affect & Information-Processing 
Numerous studies have examined the effects of mood on cognition in recent years. A 
large body of research has emerged showing that positive (i.e., happy) mood states are 
related to shallow information processing, whereas negative moods (e.g., sadness) are related 
to more in-depth processing (see Martin & Clore, 2001). (One exception appears to be 
intense negative and positive mood states, which have been shown to disrupt information-
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processing; Pham, 2007). Thus, it is not surprising that mild to moderately happy moods are 
associated with the use of heuristics in judgment and decision-making. For example, when 
presented with a persuasive message, happy participants are not influenced by the strength of 
the arguments in the message, but instead tend to focus on peripheral cues (e.g., the total 
number of arguments). Positive moods are likewise associated with other types of top-down 
processing strategies (Gasper, 2003). Negative moods, on the other hand, are associated with 
more analytic, detail-oriented, bottom-up processing strategies (Gasper, 2003). When 
presented with a persuasive message, sad participants are influenced by the strength of the 
arguments (i.e., participants are more influenced by strong than weak arguments; Mackie & 
Worth, 1991). This effect of mood on information-processing is quite robust.   
 Informational approach. Three main approaches have been taken explaining the 
influence of mood on information-processing: informational, capacity, and motivational. 
According to the informational approach, one’s current mood state is used as information in 
determining the safety of one’s environment. This approach is derived from the feelings-as-
information model developed by Schwartz and Clore (1983). Happy participants interpret 
their mood state as an indicator that their environment is safe, and as a result, it is acceptable 
to take cognitive shortcuts and be more cognitively flexible. The affective state of people 
who are sad, however, informs them that something in their environment is amiss, and leads 
to careful (i.e., more in-depth) processing of information. There are several theories that use 
an informational approach. For example, the mood-as-general knowledge model suggests 
that people in positive affective states are more likely to rely on general knowledge 
structures, whereas those in negative states are more likely to rely on the data at hand (Bless, 
2001). The general knowledge structures allow for more parsimonious processing. Another 
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similar model is the mood-as-input model (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993), which 
assumes that the effects of moods are context dependent.  
 Limited capacity approach. The second approach to explaining the influence of mood 
on processing suggests that happy moods are associated with less processing, because happy 
moods involve more cognitive capacity (i.e., “take up more cognitive space”). Thus, when 
participants are given a task that increases cognitive load while processing a message, one 
would expect negative mood participants to perform the same as their happier counterparts.  
Mackie and Worth (1991) provided support for this cognitive load approach by 
demonstrating that when positive mood is induced, participants processed persuasive 
messages less carefully than those in neutral moods, even when motivation for processing the 
message was high. However, others have posited that negative moods, not positive moods, 
are more likely to increase cognitive load (Dalgliesh, 2003; Schwartz, Bless, & Bohner, 
1991).  
 Motivational approach. The third approach, the motivational approach, suggests that 
people in positive moods are motivated to maintain their current mood state, whereas those in 
negative moods are motivated to improve their mood. This approach, also known as mood 
maintenance or mood management, is captured in two lines of research. The first of these, 
hedonic contingency (HC), suggests that people who are in a positive mood carefully 
consider hedonic consequences before making a decision because they are motivated to act 
(and think) in ways that will not jeopardize their current (positive) mood (Wegener & Petty, 
1994; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). The second, the Negative State Relief (NSR) model 
states that people in negative moods are motivated to ameliorate their current mood, as there 
is a general drive to alleviate aversive states (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). In two 
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studies, Handley and Lassiter (2002) found support for both the HC hypothesis and the NSR 
model. When participants were told about the affective content of the message beforehand, 
both happy and sad participants processed the uplifting messages more carefully than the 
depressing messages. Happy participants also processed uplifting messages more in-depth 
when they were not given affective expectancies. However, participants in a sad mood 
processed both uplifting and depressing messages at an equally high level if there were no 
affective expectations.   
 Studies on emotional distress and self-regulation have lent support to the motivational 
approach. In a series of studies, Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister (2001) found that those in 
emotional distress (i.e., negative mood states), were strategically motivated to engage in risky 
acts that would lead to mood repair. In other words, for those in bad moods, the short-term 
affective gains took precedence over their long-term self-regulation goals. The researchers 
could eliminate the effect of emotional distress on impulsive behavior by informing the 
participants that their moods were “temporarily frozen.” Thus, people only acted impulsively 
when they were in a negative mood and believed that their mood could be altered. Overall, 
the studies’ findings are consistent with the motivational approach, and contradict the other 
approaches. 
 Other effects on information-processing. In addition to the type of processing 
(bottom-up vs. top-down), affect can also influence other cognitive processes, such as 
attention and memory (Dalgliesh, 2003). For example, people are more likely to attend to 
like-valenced information (Bower, 1981). Therefore, people in happy moods are more likely 
to attend to positively-valenced information, whereas sad moods lead people to pay more 
attention to negatively-valenced information. Likewise, it is easier to recall like-valenced 
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information from memory (Eich & Forgas, 2003). Similarly, incidental emotional states (i.e., 
emotions unrelated to the object of judgment or decision) have been shown to influence 
people’s beliefs and perceptions in an assimilative (mood-congruent) fashion (Pham, 2007); 
for example, those watching a happy television program are more likely to rate a commercial 
more positively than those who viewed it during a sad program (Goldberg & Gorn, 1987). 
This assimilation is strongest when the target of one’s judgments is relatively ambiguous. 
Affect has also been shown to influence peripheral aspects of one’s self-concept (Eich & 
Forgas, 2003). This effect is stronger for people who have low self-esteem, experience strong 
affect intensity, and have a high need for approval. Happy and sad moods also appear to 
simplify the structure of one’s self-concept as well as concepts of known others (i.e., these 
concepts organize around a single dimension rather than multiple dimensions; DeSteno & 
Salovey, 1997).  
Affect & Risky Decision-Making 
 According to Loewenstein and colleagues (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 
2001), affect can influence decision-making in two separate ways: through cognitive and 
emotional reactions to the (risky) decision. First, one’s anticipated emotions to the potential 
outcomes of the risk scenario (e.g., regret) can influence one’s cognitive reaction to the 
decision. Second, one’s emotional reactions to the risk decision (i.e., anticipatory emotions) 
can also influence the decision-making process. Anticipated and anticipatory emotions both 
play a role in Loewenstein’s risk-as-feelings model (Loewenstein et al., 2001). According to 
the model, one’s anticipated emotions are considered one of the potential consequences of 
the action, and along with the subjective probabilities associated with the potential outcomes, 
influence both cognitive evaluation and feelings regarding the risky decision. People’s 
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emotional reactions to the thought of the risk (i.e., anticipatory emotions) depend on a 
number of factors, such as the vividness of the imagined consequences or one’s personal 
experience with the behavior. According to the model, anticipatory emotions and cognitive 
evaluations (including anticipated emotions) influence each other, and both influence 
behavior. Thus, the model suggests that cognitive evaluations can indirectly influence 
behavior through one’s feelings.   
 Another explanation for the influence of affect on decision-making is that people use 
an affect heuristic when making judgments. This explanation proposes that mental 
representations of objects and events are “tagged” with varying degrees of affect (Slovic, 
Finucaine, Peters, & McGregor, 2002). These tags, in turn, act as cues when judgments are 
made later. The more precise the affective tag, the larger the impact that the affect has on the 
decision. The affective tag is dependent on the context of the situation.  Therefore, certain 
affective tags may be activated in risk-conducive environs.  
Affect & Risk Behavior/Cognitions 
 Positive affect. Previous research has looked at the relation between affective states, 
risky decision-making, and risky behavior. For example, Isen and colleagues have conducted 
a series of experiments examining the effects of happy mood states on risky betting behavior 
(Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Isen & 
Patrick, 1983; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). This line of research has shown that 
happy participants tend to be “cautiously optimistic” (Nygren et al., 1996) compared to 
participants in a neutral mood. Participants in a happy mood (induced by receiving a small 
gift) are more cautious than neutral mood participants when the risk is “real” or the potential 
loss is large (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987; Nygren et al., 1996). When the risk is 
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purely hypothetical and the potential loss is small, happy participants tend to be more willing 
to place risky bets than neutral mood participants (Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987; 
Nygren et al,, 1996). Isen and her colleagues have also demonstrated that when the bet is 
“high-risk,” participants in a happy mood are more likely to think about the consequences of 
losing than are those in a neutral mood (Isen & Geva, 1987). When the potential loss is small 
or inconsequential, the amount of contemplation about losses does not differ between 
positive and neutral mood conditions. Isen and her colleagues have also shown that people in 
happy moods view losses as being more unpleasant and therefore more threatening (Isen et 
al., 1988); however, there is no difference in how happy participants perceive potential gains. 
Isen and colleagues have not studied negative moods, or examined risk behaviors other than 
lottery betting tasks. 
 Negative affect. While Isen’s line of research suggests that positive moods are related 
to risk aversion, other researchers have found support for the idea that negative mood is 
related to risk-taking. In a series of six studies, Leith and Baumeister (1996) found that 
negative mood states (e.g., embarrassment, anger, sadness) were related to increased 
preferences for high-risk, high-payoff options as compared to neutral or “good” mood states. 
This effect, however, was only found when the subjectively unpleasant state was paired with 
high arousal. These findings suggest that negative, high-arousal affective states are 
associated with decreased self-regulation of behavior. On a related note, it has been found 
that negative affective states, specifically anxiety, fear, anger, and embarrassment, are 
associated with self-destructive (i.e., risky) behaviors (Baumeister & Scher, 1988). Hockey 
and colleagues, however, found that state and trait depression and anxiety were not 
consistently related to either risk behavior or risk cognitions (Hockey, Maule, Clough, & 
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Bdzola, 2000). Instead, they found that state fatigue was related to increased risk-taking. 
More recent research has investigated the role of affect in performance on the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). Suhr and Tsanadis 
(2007) found that negative affect predicted riskier performance on the task; however, affect 
was not manipulated in the study. 
Additional findings. In studies that have both positive and negative affect conditions 
(usually happy and sad), it is generally found that negative mood participants are more risky 
than those in positive moods (Chuang & Chang, 2007; Mittal & Ross, 1998). Happy 
participants are more likely to interpret an ambiguous business scenario in a favorable 
manner (i.e., view it as an opportunity); however, participants in a negative mood are more 
likely to be willing to take a risk (Mittal & Ross, 1998). This study also found that negative 
mood participants were more likely to be influenced by how the scenario was framed. They 
interpreted their results as showing that either negative mood participants were processing 
the information more carefully or that positive mood participants were overriding the threat 
frames and viewing all the scenarios more favorably. These results support the general 
findings of affect and information processing research discussed earlier, and the idea that 
negative mood states are related to risky behaviors.  
 Many studies have focused on the relation between state affect and risk-taking.  In a 
study of trait affect and decision-making, Williams and colleagues (Williams, Zainuba, & 
Jackson, 2003) looked at the relation between risk decision-making, and positive (PA) and 
negative affect (NA). Neither PA nor NA were related to increased risk-taking. At least for 
some risk perceptions, high PA participants tended to be more optimistic, and high NA 
participants more pessimistic, than participants low on these traits. Risk intention (actually 
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measured as an expectation) was not related to either PA or NA. However, high PA 
participants did not assess potential gains or losses more negatively, suggesting that losses 
“did not loom larger” as Isen posits.   
In general, recent research supports the idea that happy participants are more risk-
averse and sad participants are more risk-taking. Other research, however, has divergent 
findings. For example, Chou, Lee, and Ho (2007) induced participants into sad, neutral, and 
happy moods and found that risk-taking on a version of the choice dilemmas questionnaire 
was associated with positive, not negative, mood states. It’s also been found that there is no 
relation between affect and risk-taking (Clark, Iverson, & Goodwin, 2001) or that sad people 
are more risk-averse (Yuen & Lee, 2003). In the study by Yuen and Lee (2003), participants’ 
risk tendencies were measured using scenarios, and it is unclear how “real” these scenarios 
were to the participants. Therefore, the findings may be analogous to those reported by Isen 
and colleagues in the happy mood/minimal risk conditions (e.g., Isen & Geva, 1987, i.e., 
when stakes were high in a betting task, happy participants were more risk-averse than 
neutral mood participants, whereas when stakes were low, happy participants were more risk-
taking). The effect of affect on risk-taking is likely quite complex, and it is not surprising that 
researchers have found differing results, as they have studied different behaviors, and used 
different methodologies and measures in their designs (as discussed later). 
Classic research on risk perception has demonstrated that participants in negative 
moods estimate the frequency of undesirable events (e.g., diseases, life problems) to be 
significantly higher than those in neutral moods, whereas those in positive moods estimate 
significantly lower frequencies than those in neutral moods (Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This 
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research would also suggest that people in positive moods are more likely to engage in risky 
behaviors compared to those in negative moods. 
Affect and Health Behavior 
The association between negative affect and substance use has been well-studied, as 
researchers have posited that alcohol and other substances are often used as a coping 
mechanism to deal with aversive emotional states (e.g., Measelle, Stice, & Springer, 2006).  
This form of emotion regulation has been used to explain the relation between negative affect 
and other forms of health risk behaviors. For example, Cooper and colleagues identified six 
motives for engaging in sex (Cooper, Shapiro, & Powers, 1998). Two of the motives have 
links to affect regulation: enhancement motives (e.g., having sex for the enjoyment and 
pleasure) and coping motives (e.g., having sex to relieve stress). In general, males were more 
likely to endorse these motives, which were related to greater risk-taking. Coping motives 
were related to more promiscuous sex (both cross-sectionally and over time); however, 
coping motives were not related to failure to use condoms. Cooper and colleagues have also 
noted similar motives for drinking behaviors (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995). In a 
model of risky behaviors, Cooper, Agocha, and Sheldon (2000) posit that risky behaviors are 
predicted by enhancement and coping motives. The former motives are driven by 
extraversion, whereas the latter are related to neuroticism. Whereas drinking motives tend to 
depend on the situation (Cooper et al., 1995), motives to engage in sex tend to be more trait-
like (Cooper et al., 1998).  Others have found that people who endorse these types of coping 
motives are more likely to engage in substance use and encounter more severe addiction-
related consequences (e.g., Hussong et al., 2007; Shiffman et al., 2007; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 
2007). 
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Risky sexual behavior. Recent studies on affect and sexual behaviors have shown a 
relatively clear relation between negative or aversive states and risky sexual practices 
(Auerbach, Abela, & Ho, 2007; Brown et al., 2006; Paxton, Valois, Watckins, Huebner, & 
Drane, 2007; Sterk, Theall, & Ellison, 2006). However, an earlier meta-analysis                                               
failed to find a significant relationship (Cropaz & Marks, 2001). Cropaz and Marks (2001) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 34 studies, to examine the relation between negative affect and 
sexual risk-taking behavior, and concluded that there was no significant relation. They note 
that effect sizes tend to be greater when composite sexual risk measures are used, as opposed 
to single risk behavior measures, and suggest that previous studies may have lacked the 
power to detect significant effects. They also note that virtually no studies have investigated 
a possible curvilinear relationship between negative affect and risk-taking. It is unclear why 
the meta-analysis failed to find a significant relation between negative affect and sexual risk-
taking; it appears that the more recent studies, conducted since the meta-analysis, have been 
more consistently finding an effect (e.g., Auerbach et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2006;  Paxton 
et al., 2007; Sterk et al., 2006).  
Intentions. A couple of studies have investigated the influence of affect on intentions 
to engage in risky health behaviors. Armitage and colleagues (Armitage, Conner, & Norman, 
1999) examined how positive and negative affect influence the elements of the theory of 
planned behavior with respect to condom use and eating behavior. For both behaviors, it was 
found that participants in a negative mood were more likely to base their behavioral 
intentions on their attitudes toward engaging in the healthful behavior (i.e., using a condom, 
eating healthily), suggesting that they were more problem-focused and detail-oriented. 
Attitudes are one of the prmary predictors of intentions in expectancy-value theories, thus it 
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was concluded that those in a negative affective state were thinking in a more systematic 
manner.  Participants in positive mood states, however, based their intentions on subjective 
norms or self-identity, a less reliable source. The authors concluded that, as previous research 
has found, negative moods were associated with more systematic processing and positive 
moods with more heuristic processing; thus, they predicted that positive moods should be 
associated with increased risky behaviors. Another study on affect and intentions to engage 
in risky sexual behavior, however, found a different pattern. MacDonald and Martineau 
(2002) found that participants in negative moods were more likely to report intentions 
(actually behavioral expectations)1 to engage in risky sexual behavior. Participants in the 
negative mood condition reported a higher proportion of positive thoughts regarding having 
unprotected sex, than did those in the positive mood condition. These findings suggest that 
those in negative moods are most at risk because of their intentions to engage in risky health 
behavior.  
Perceived vulnerability. Research has demonstrated that people in positive mood 
states tend to be more optimistic (i.e., perceive themselves as being less at risk to potential 
negative outcomes) than those in neutral or negative mood states, whereas the latter tend to 
be more realistic about their personal risk (Salovey et al., 2001). People in positive moods 
also tend to perceive higher levels of self-efficacy and outcome-efficacy compared to those 
in negative moods. For example, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989) found that happy participants 
experiencing cold or flu symptoms, were more confident in their ability to perform health-
promoting (and illness-alleviating) behaviors. Happy people perceive they have more control 
over the situation and are better able to control their behavior in a way that minimizes risk 
(Salovey et al., 2001). However, other studies have failed to find evidence for the depressive 
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realism effect (Pham, 2007), and it is suggested that the phenomenon may not generalize to 
more meaningful and consequential tasks (Pacini, Muir, & Epstein, 1998). 
Shortcomings of Previous Research 
 Many of the inconsistencies in the literature on affect and risk-taking, can be linked to 
the various ways constructs have been operationalized (Ethier et al., 2006; Walch & 
Rudolph, 2006). For example, negative affect may be a broad measure that includes 
depressive symptoms, anxiety, and worry (Pardini, Lochman, & Wells, 2004); alternatively, 
some studies have focused on specific emotions (e.g., Paxton et al., 2007). Similarly, affect 
has been measured at both the trait and state levels.  In addition, the definition of risk-taking 
varies from study to study. In some cases, a more aggregate measure of risk is used, rather 
than a more specific measure (Ethier et al., 2006; Walch & Rudolph, 2006).  
 It is unclear the extent to which previous research on affect and decision-making in 
betting or gambling scenarios (e.g., Clark et al., 2001) generalizes to decisions regarding 
real-world health decisions. Also some studies have focused on the effects of either positive 
affect (e.g., Arkes et al., 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen et al., 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983; 
Nygren et al., 1996) or negative affect (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1996), rather than both. 
Other studies are limited by the fact that a correlational design was used (e.g., Suhr & 
Tsanadis, 2007), and causal statements about the influence of mood states cannot be made. 
Negative moods, particularly sad moods, can be difficult to induce in participants 
(Mackie & Worth, 1991). Researchers using film clips or stories often use scenarios that 
involve death or dying (e.g., show a clip from “The Champ” where the father dies). Though 
these scenarios are often more effective than other mood induction techniques (Westermann, 
Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996), it is likely that these scenarios make death (mortality) more 
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salient to the participants, and studies of terror management theory suggest that participants, 
at least males, who have had mortality made salient are more likely to engage in risky 
behavior (Hirschberger, Florian, Mikulincer, Goldenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002).  
In sum, research in this area has been troubled by differences in how constructs are 
defined and measured, concerns regarding external validity, and issues regarding induction of 
negative affective states. These issues have likely contributed to the diverse nature of the 
findings. As discussed in more detail later, the current study addressed these issues.  
Prototype/Willingness Model 
 Risk cognitions are the focus of the Prototype/Willingness (prototype) model used in 
the current study (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1995, 1997; Gibbons, Gerrard, & Lane, 2003). A 
central construct in the model is behavioral willingness (BW), defined as an openness to risk 
opportunity—what one is willing to do when placed in a risk-conducive environment. 
According to the model, both BW and behavioral intentions (BI) predict risky behavior; 
however, there are two important differences between the two constructs. First, BW involves 
less pre-contemplation of both the behavior and its potential outcomes (Gibbons et al., 2003; 
Gibbons, Gerrard, Ouellette, & Burzette, 1998). In contrast, BI is more planful and involves 
thinking about both the behavior and its consequences. Second, there is less internal 
attribution of responsibility with BW as compared to BI (Gibbons et al., 2003).  
Willingness. According to the model, willingness to engage in a risky behavior 
usually develops before intentions; thus, BW is a better predictor in adolescents and young 
adults than is intention (Pomery, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Gerrard, 2008).  It is often the 
case that young people have no intention or expectation of engaging in a risky behavior, but 
may have some degree of willingness to engage when in certain situations. These individuals 
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(low BI/high BW) are considered especially at-risk, as they are less likely to plan ahead (e.g., 
carry a condom, have a designated driver; Gibbons et al., 2006). Other young people have 
clear plans to engage in risky behavior (high BI), and their willingness is typically in-line 
with this goal state (high BW).  
 Prototype images. Another key construct in the model is prototype image. It refers to 
one’s perception of the typical person one’s own age who engages in the behavior (Gibbons, 
Gerrard, & Lane, 2003). For example, children and adolescents have been shown to have 
relative clear images of the types of people their age who smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol. 
Not surprisingly, these images are fairly unfavorable. Young people are aware of these social 
images and realize that, to some extent, people may associate that image with them if they 
were to engage in the behavior. Previous research based on the model has found that 
prototypes predict willingness to engage in the behavior (i.e., the more favorable the image, 
the more willing the participant reports being). To my knowledge, no studies have examined 
the effects of mood states on prototype images of risky health behaviors. 
 Role of dual-processing. The prototype model is considered a modified dual-process 
model, in that the different pathways reflect different styles of information processing.  In 
many ways, the reasoned path (through BI) is similar to the rational processing system in 
Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999), 
whereas the reactive path (through BW) is similar to the experiential processing system. 
According to CEST, the experiential processing system is more affect-based, and more likely 
to be influenced by heuristics; the rational system is more deliberative and analytic. Using 
this logic, the reactive path (as measured by BW) is expected to be more influenced by 
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affective states than the reasoned path (as measured by BI; Gibbons, Etcheverry, Stock, & 
Gerrard, 2008).  
 Risk perceptions. Another component of the prototype model is perceived 
vulnerability. Perceived vulnerability in the model refers to the perceptions of personal risk 
(i.e., the likelihood that one will experience the negative consequences of engaging in a risky 
behavior). Typically, perceived vulnerability is measured using a conditional measure (e.g., If 
you were to engage in unprotected sex, what is the likelihood you would contract an STD?). 
In the model, perceived vulnerability is considered part of the attitude construct and relates to 
both BI and BW (Gibbons et al., 2003). As noted earlier, positive mood states have been 
shown to be associated with lower levels of perceived risk (Salovey et al., 2001). This would 
suggest that those in a happy mood would be more likely to report more willingness and 
intentions to engage in a risky behavior, as they would feel less vulnerable to the potential 
negative consequences. 
Current Line of Research 
To address these gaps in the affect and health risk literature, a series of studies has 
been conducted examining the relation between happy and sad mood states and BW to 
engage in sexual behavior. These studies have shown an inverse relation between mood 
states and BW (Pomery, 2004; Pomery, 2008a). First, cross-sectional relations between 
affective states and BW were examined, controlling for BI.  Willingness to have unprotected 
sex with one’s boyfriend or girlfriend was negatively related to affect at each of the three 
waves of the panel data that were examined (though the relation was only significant at two 
of the waves). In contrast, there was a positive relation between participants’ expectations to 
have sex in the next year at each of the three waves (again, it was only significant at two 
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waves). Although the measures used were not ideal for measuring BW and BI (they were 
earlier, cruder versions of the current measures, which lacked the specific wording and level 
of correspondence of the current measures), it still demonstrates that the two types of 
cognitions (BW and BI) are distinct and relate differently to affective states. Those in a more 
negative mood state at the time of each data collection reported they were more willing to 
have unprotected sex (i.e., engage in a risky sexual behavior) and less likely to have sex in 
the next year (perhaps representing depressive realism). Those in happy moods, on the other 
hand, reported lower willingness to have unprotected sex (i.e, were more risk-averse) and a 
greater likelihood of having sex in the next year (perhaps being overly optimistic). 
An experimental laboratory study was also conducted, in which happy and sad mood 
were induced and the BW and BI measures used were more similar (Pomery, 2004). The 
study found that those in the sad conditions reported higher BW to engage in unprotected sex 
with a casual partner and those in positive moods reported lower levels of BW. The study 
also found that emotional states had little effect on participants’ levels of BI. These findings 
were expected, given that BI is more stable across time than BW (i.e., BW is more labile; 
Gerrard, Gibbons, & Gano, 2003). Also, BW is presumed to be more affect-laden than BI 
(Gibbons et al, 2003), and therefore more influenced by it. It should be  noted that these 
effects were moderated by the order of the BW and BI measures, such that the effect was 
only significant on the cognition measure (BW or BI) answered first. Typically, BW is higher 
when it is answered before BI. Since BI activates a more reasoned, analytic processing style, 
it becomes harder to “switch over” to a more experiential, heuristic processing style. The 
findings were similar for both scaled and open-ended BW and BI measures. 
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This research has given support to the motivational approach to affect’s influence on 
risky decision-making (i.e., those in happy moods are inclined to be more risk-averse in order 
to maintain their mood, whereas those in negative moods are more risk-seeking, in order to 
improve their current mood state). As the previous study (Pomery, 2004) did not include a 
neutral mood condition, the relative strengths of the happy and sad mood states on risk-
taking are unclear. In addition, another study of Iowa State University undergraduates 
supports the idea that mood states can have a motivating influence on sexual behavior 
(Pomery, 2008b). As part of a more lengthy questionnaire, students (N = 667) were asked to 
what extent having unprotected sex with both steady and casual partners would improve their 
mood if they were “feeling bad.” Self-reported virgins (30% of the sample) were excluded 
from the analyses. On 7-point scales (anchored at 1 Not at all to 7 Definitely would), more 
than half of the participants (59%) answered with a 5, 6, or 7 with respect to steady partners 
(for casual partners, the number was 27%). In addition, participants were asked if they had 
ever had sex with either a steady or casual partner to improve their mood. For steady 
partners, 48% of participants reported having had sex “a few times” or more to improve their 
mood (20% for casual partners). Males were significantly more likely to report that having 
unprotected sex with steady and casual partners would improve their mood, that they’d 
considered having unprotected sex to improve their mood, and that they’d engaged in sex 
with casual partners to improve their mood. There were no gender differences for having had 
sex with a steady partner to improve one’s mood. These findings suggest that young adults 
engage in sexual behavior (including more risky practices) in order to cope with negative 
emotions, which is consistent with the findings of Cooper and colleagues’ research discussed 
earlier. 
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Conclusions 
Although the findings of research on the influence of affect on risky behavior and 
cognitions, especially those that are health-related, are mixed, there is an increasing number 
of studies, including my previous studies, that support the idea that people in negative 
affective states are more likely to be risk-seeking in order to repair their mood. Likewise, 
there is evidence that positive affective states, when they are perceived as being “real” or 
“high-stakes,” are more likely to be associated with risk-averse behavior and cognitions. My 
own line of research has shown that willingness to engage in risky sexual behaviors is related 
to mood states, whereas, consistent with the dual-processing nature of the prototype model, 
intentions are less influenced by mood. However, the mechanism(s) behind the influence that 
mood states have on BW is not clear. 
Current Study 
The current study was designed to tackle some of the unanswered questions in the 
literature, as well as address many of the aforementioned shortcomings of previous research. 
The current study induced positive (happy), negative (sad), and neutral affective states, and 
measured risk cognitions. One possible explanation for the affect-BW relation is that affect is 
influencing how participants’ perceive the situations and judge the potential consequences. 
Generally, when making decisions, people consider the potential consequences of the 
behavior, which are typically positively or negatively valenced. How these outcome 
expectancies (i.e., expected consequences of an action) are judged, in turn, influences their 
intentions and ultimately their behavior choice (Ajzen, 1998). The current study explored 
whether affect influences the time spent reading positive as opposed to negative outcome 
expectancies, as well as the extent to which participants endorsed each outcome expectancy. 
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In addition, the current study aimed to study the relation between affect and risk 
cognitions for groups that were at varying levels of risk to engage in the risky behavior, 
based on the tenets of the prototype model. Participants were recruited based on their 
previously reported levels of BI and BW. It was expected that the effects of the mood 
manipulation would be stronger for the “at-risk, non-intending” group (i.e., low BI/high BW) 
than for the “intending” group (i.e., high BI/high BW). The “intending” group already has a 
plan (intention) of engaging in the risk behavior, and this is unlikely to be affected by mood 
states. The “at-risk” group, however, does not have engaging in the risk behavior as a goal 
state, and has more elastic risk cognitions. The relatively rigid nature of the “intending” 
group is more indicative of reasoned, analytic information-processing styles, whereas the “at-
risk” group’s processing style is indicative of more reactive, heuristic information 
processing.  The percentage of adolescents and young adults that fall in the “at-risk” category 
varies as a function of the risk behavior under investigation, but typically falls between 20-
25%. 
The current study used a 2-pronged mood induction procedure, involving music, and 
guided imagery vignettes. Past research has shown that imagination-based mood inductions 
are particularly effective in inducing negative mood states (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 
1994). Also, the music for the negative affect (sad) condition was selected so as not to make 
death salient. The study was a 3 (affect: positive, negative, and neutral) x 2 (prior BI/BW 
level:  low BI/high BW vs. high BI/high BW) between-participants design. After the mood 
induction, participants were presented with outcome expectances, both positive and negative 
(e.g., positive: it would bring me physical pleasure; negative: I could contract an STD), 
regarding unprotected sexual intercourse with a casual partner (a clear risky health behavior). 
21 
 
The participants were asked questions regarding their endorsement of these outcome 
expectancies. In addition, time spent reading and responding was measured. Following the 
outcome expectancies, participants’ willingness, perceived vulnerability, and other 
cognitions related to the risk behavior were measured. 
 The following hypotheses were posited: 
1) The mood manipulation would influence which type of outcome expectancy (positive 
vs. negative) participants attended to and endorsed. 
a) Participants in the negative mood state conditions would be motivated to 
improve their mood state, and should more strongly endorse the positive 
outcome expectancies. This reflects the fact that those in sad mood states have 
been shown to report increased levels of BW. 
b) Participants in the positive mood conditions would attend to the positively-
valenced outcome expectancies (e.g., a mood-congruent effect), spending 
more time reading and responding to them; however, they would not endorse 
these expectancies more. This reflects the past findings that those in happy 
mood states are more risk-averse and report lower levels of BW. 
2) The effects of mood on the outcome expectancies measures would be stronger for the 
“risky non-intenders” (i.e., the low BI/high BW group), than for the “intenders” (i.e., 
the high BI/high BW group). The latter group is likely more set in how they would 
act in such a risky scenario, therefore they would need less time reading the outcome 
expectancies, and their risk cognitions (e.g., BW) would be less influenced by the 
mood manipulation. This finding would be consistent with the notion that the 
“intending” group is engaging in more analytic information-processing. The former 
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group, however, would tend to be more inexperienced with the behavior and the 
situation, and their BW should be more labile; therefore it was expected that the 
mood manipulation would have a stronger influence on this group, consistent with the 
notion that they were engaging in more heuristic information-processing. 
3) With respect to PV, it was expected to be inversely related to BW, but be independent 
of the effect of mood on BW (consistent with the findings in Pomery, 2004). That is 
to say that although increased levels of perceptions of vulnerability were expected to 
be associated with lower levels of willingness, this was not anticipated to mediate any 
of the effects of the mood manipulation on BW. The effects of mood on the risk 
cognitions assessed at the end of the study (i.e., willingness,  perceived vulnerability, 
intentions, and prototype image), would depend, in part, on how long the induced 
mood would last and whether or not participants’ mood states were affected by their 
exposure to the positive and negative expectancies and answering the BW measure. If 
the mood manipulation is successful for the remainder of the study, it was expected 
that mood would not influence BI, but would be inversely related to BW and 
prototype—those in the sad mood condition would report the highest levels of 
willingness (Pomery, 2004) and most favorable prototype images. 
METHOD 
Participants.  
Participants were current or former undergraduates at Iowa State University, 
receiving either class credit or monetary compensation for their participation. Participants 
who had completed their class credit or were no longer enrolled in a psychology course were 
paid $10 during the spring 2008 semester, and $15 during the summer of 2008 (43 
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participants received credit, 29 received $10;  40 received $15). Measures of behavior, BW, 
and BI for sex with a casual partner were collected during departmental mass-testing 
sessions. Participants were recruited from the two Spring 2008 mass-testing sessions (the 
second commonly referred to as “scale validation”), Summer 2008 mass-testing, and Fall 
2007 mass-testing. Originally, participants were selected if they met the following criteria: 
non-virgins who reported at least minimal willingness to engage in casual sex and were either 
high or low on intentions to have casual sex in the future. Due to slow recruitment, the non-
virgin criterion was dropped and anyone who reported at least minimal willingness to engage 
in casual sex was invited to participate. Two participants from the summer 2008 mass-testing 
session did not meet the willingness criteria, as their mass-testing data were not available at 
the time of their recruitment. 
The final sample consisted of 112 participants (79 males, 33 females; 77 from Spring 
2008 mass-testing, 22 from Fall 2007 mass-testing, 11 from Spring 2008 scale validation, 
and two from Summer 2008 mass-testing). Two participants’ data were excluded from all 
analyses—one participant experienced problems with the musical mood induction, and was 
not exposed to any of the music, and the second was believed to be on her cell phone 
throughout the study, as the experimenter heard the phone ring and the participant talking. 
The expectancy endorsement items of an additional participant were excluded as she reported 
misreading the scaling of the items. Thus, the analyses are based on samples of 109 or 110 
(see Table 1 for cell Ns). Based on the findings of Pomery (2004), it was estimated that the 
effect size for induced mood on BW was moderate. Predicting a Cohen’s d of 0.50, and a 
two-tailed α of .05, then 50 participants would be needed per condition to result in a power 
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      Table 1. Ns per cell 
 Happy Sad Neutral Total 
High BW/ Low BI 18 (14) 21 (12) 16 (10) 55 (36) 
High BW/High BI 20 (14) 18 (15) 17 (13) 55 (42) 
Total 38 (28) 39 (27) 33 (23) 110 (78) 
       Note: Ns in parentheses are the number of males per cell. 
 
of .70 (for power = .80, 64 participants per cell would be needed). The number of 
participants, however, was influenced by the distribution of BW and BI measures in mass-
testing (used to select the two risk level groups). Every effort was made to recruit a sample 
large enough to have the power to detect any significant effects. 
Measures  
Behavioral willingness. Willingness was measured using hypothetical scenarios 
during mass-testing sessions and during the experiment (see Appendices A & B). For 
example, one risky sex scenario involved attending a party and meeting someone attractive 
that the participant did not know very well (i.e., a casual partner), and neither the participant 
nor the other person had a condom available. After each scenario, participants were asked to 
rate how willing they would be to engage in risky sexual behaviors (e.g., how willing to have 
sexual intercourse), using a 7-pt. scale (1 Not at all to 7 Very willing). The experimental BW 
index was created by averaging the four items from the two scenarios (α = .87). The BW 
scenarios varied across mass-testing sessions, however.2 Spring and Summer 2008 mass-
testing included measures from two scenarios (one that mentioned that a condom was not 
available, one that did not mention condoms); Spring 2008 scale validation participants only 
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had the version of the scenario that specifically mentioned no condoms being available; Fall 
2007 mass-testing participants’ BW was only assessed for the scenario that did not mention 
condoms. To address this issue of BW items varying across mass-testing sessions, each 
participant’s scores were standardized within their mass-testing session for every BW 
measure they answered. Then these z-scores were averaged and used as the BW mass-testing 
index.  The Ms and SDs for the various BW measures at each mass-testing session are shown 
in Appendix C. 
Behavioral intentions. Intentions (and expectations) to engage in unprotected, casual 
sex were assessed during both the mass-testing and experimental sessions (see Appendices A 
& B. Behavioral expectations (BE) are similar to intentions in that they assess the extent to 
which one thinks or expects to do a behavior in the future, as compared to their plans to do 
the behavior. Many researchers consider BI and BE to represent the same core construct 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). In the experimental session, there were three BI items and three 
parallel BE items: “In the next 6 months, do you intend to [how likely is that you will] have 
casual sex / have sex without a condom / have casual sex without a condom?” Each item was 
measured on a 7-pt. scale. These six items were averaged to form the experimental BI/BE 
index (α = .70).  As with BW, the BI and BE questions varied across mass-testing sessions. 
All four sessions included a measure of intention to have sex with a casual partner in the next 
6 months, and all but one (Spring 2008 scale validation) included a measure of expectation of 
having sex with a casual partner. With the exception of Fall 2007 mass-testing, all answered 
an item assessing intention to have sex without a condom. Two sessions (Spring 2008 mass-
testing and scale validation) assessed intentions to have sex with a casual partner without a 
condom. As done with BW, participants’ BI and BE items were standardized within their 
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mass-testing session and then averaged to form their mass-testing BI/BE index. See 
Appendix C for Ms and SDs of these measures for each mass-testing session. 
Outcome expectancies. During the experimental session, participants were presented 
with both positive and negative outcome expectancies (see Appendix D). For each 
expectancy, they first read the statement and clicked “next” and then were asked two 
questions: (a) did this go through your mind (in this situation; 1 = No, 2 = Maybe, 3 = Yes) 
and (b) how important would this be to you (3-pt scale: Not at all, Somewhat, Very). The 
endorsements for “go through your mind” and importance were separately averaged for the 
eight positive and eight negative items (Positive “go through mind” α = .79; Positive 
“important to you” α = .78; Negative “go through mind” α = .60; Negative “important to 
you” α = .74). In addition, the time each participant spent reading and responding to each 
outcome expectancy was automatically recorded by the computer using MediaLab software. 
Due to a programming error, reaction time was not measured for one of the positive outcome 
expectancies. The reaction times were transformed using a natural log transformation prior to 
creating indices. 
Behavior. Previous behavior was measured in mass-testing (see Appendix A). All 
participants reported their lifetime number of sexual partners in mass-testing. However, the 
other behavior items varied across the mass-testing sessions. All but Spring 2008 scale 
validation included a measure of prior sex with casual partners; all but the Fall 2007 mass-
testing session included a measure of how many times participants’ had engaged in casual 
sex while not using a condom. In addition, all but Fall 2007 included a measure of how often 
they had a condom accessible when they went out to a party or a bar (5-pt. scale).  
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Perceived vulnerability. Perceived risk was measured in the experimental session (see 
Appendix B). The participants were asked three questions about the likelihood that a negative 
outcome, specifically contracting an STD, would occur if they were to engage in the behavior 
(7-pt. scale). These three items were averaged to form the PV index (α = .78). 
Prototype. Participants were asked to think about the typical person their age who 
engages in casual sex without using a condom. Participants then rated how likely it was that 
the person was smart, confused, popular, immature, “cool” (sophisticated), self-confident, 
independent, careless, unattractive, dull (boring), considerate, and self-centered. The negative 
adjectives were reverse-scored and an index was made by averaging the 12 scores (α = .78). 
 Baseline reading and response time. Four filler items were used to measure baseline 
reading and response times. These items went along with the cover story. The natural logs of 
the reaction times were averaged to form the baseline response time measure (α = .66). 
Mood questionnaire. A mood adjective scale was used in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the mood induction (see Appendix E). The scale was developed during 
earlier piloting sessions and has been used in previous laboratory studies (e.g., Pomery, 
2004).   
Experimental Procedure   
Initial cover story. First, participants in the experimental session read and signed an 
informed consent form. After they had completed the form, they were told that they would be 
taking part in two separate studies. One study, they were told, involved how well they could 
imagine and recall certain scenarios, and how background music affected their performance. 
They were told that for this study, they would be asked to imagine various scenarios and 
think about them in-depth. The other study was then described as more of a filler task (“in 
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between the two imagery tasks…”). The purpose of the study, they were told, was to learn 
more about how college students reacted to complex decision-making situations.  After the 
“filler” task (i.e., the outcome expectancies and risk cognitions measures), participants were 
be led to believe that they would repeat the imagery tasks and answer questions related to it.  
 Mood induction. After being led to individual cubicles, participants were told they 
were in the “habituation condition,” which means that they would hear background music for 
the remainder of the experiment. Participants in the negative affect condition listened to 
selections from Barber’s Adagio for Strings; Mahler’s Symphony No. 5 in C# minor, 
participants in the positive affect condition listened to selections from Mozart’s Eine Kleine 
Nachtmusik, Bach’s Brandenburg Concerto Nos. 2 and 3, and Handel’s Water Music; the 
neutral mood condition heard selections from Debussy’s La Mer and Prélude à l’après-midi 
d’un faune. These selections have been used to induce affective states in other research (e.g., 
Balch, Myers, & Papotto, 1999; Hufford, 2001; Niedenthal et al., 2000).   
 Participants were instructed to complete the guided imagery task (see Appendix F). 
An audio tape was played over the intercom or on a tape player, depending on the laboratory 
in which the participant was being run, (see Appendix E for scenarios). There was 
approximately 40 seconds between scenarios. Music was playing in the background while 
participants completed the task. The scenarios were adapted from vignettes used in other 
research to induce happy and sad mood states (Mayer, Allen, & Beauregard, 1995). When the 
guided imagery task was completed, participants were instructed to complete the “Current 
Feelings” questionnaire (the mood manipulation check; see Appendix D).  
Presentation of scenario. Next, the participants were asked some filler questions 
related to the cover story (e.g., where they typically get their news from); in addition, these 
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items were used to determine participants’ baseline reading and response times. They were 
then told that they would be asked to read and answer questions regarding part of a survey 
that asked respondents to report how they would act in certain situations. In order to increase 
the perceived credibility, they were told the survey was recently conducted on a nation-wide 
sample of young adults. Then, the computer “randomly” selected a situation for them (i.e., 
implying that other participants were viewing different scenarios). All participants were then 
presented with the first BW scenario described in the Measures section and asked to imagine 
themselves in that scenario (see Appendix C).  
 Outcome expectancy measures. After being exposed to the scenario for 3 minutes, 
participants were randomly presented with the 16 outcome expectancies (see Appendix C for 
8 positive and 8 negative outcome expectancies). They were told that these were some of the 
more common reasons the survey respondents gave as to why they would act a certain way in 
the scenario. First, they read the outcome expectancy and clicked “next.” Then, they were 
asked two questions about their endorsement of each scenario: whether the outcome 
expectancy came to mind and how important it would be to them in that scenario (each on a 
separate screen and prefaced by the original expectancy, as they could not look back): 
Unbeknownst to participants, reaction times for each of the following were recorded: a) 
reading each outcome expectancy, b) answering whether it came to mind, and c) answering 
how important it was to them. Each reaction time was analyzed separately. 
 Additional measures and debriefing. Following the presentation of the expectancies, 
participants were asked questions regarding their BW, PV, BI, and prototype image, 
supposedly to better understand their reaction to the survey results (see Appendix B). These 
measures, in fact, were additional dependent variables in the experiment. When the 
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participants had completed these measures, they were debriefed using a spiral procedure. 
Participants were first asked about their suspicions regarding the experiment in general and 
then, more specifically, regarding the imagery task, the music, the survey task, and the 
questionnaires. They were told the purpose of the study and it was revealed that there would 
be no additional parts to the study (i.e., they wouldn’t have to repeat the guided imagery task 
or answer any more questions). The most common suspicions were that there was not going 
to be a second study (n = 12) or that the selection of the situation was not random (n = 6). 
Around ten percent mentioned mood states prior to the debriefing (e.g., picked up on the fact 
that the music and scenarios went together and were depressing or uplifting). No participants 
were excluded from analyses based on their suspicion level, as none was able to specifically 
guess the studies’ hypotheses (indeed, although some participants reported suspicions, they 
still appeared to believe the general cover story).  
RESULTS 
Randomization 
 One-way ANOVAs were conducted on the mass-testing measures to determine 
whether randomization was successful across the three mood conditions. These analyses 
showed that randomization was achieved in that none of the F-statistics was significant at the 
.05 level. The following were marginally significant, however: willingness to have oral sex 
with a casual partner (in both scenarios, ps < .10), intentions to have casual sex without a 
condom (p < .10), number of lifetime sexual partners (p = .07), and past behavior of casual 
sex without a condom (p = .08). In each case, the average for those in the sad mood 
conditions was higher than the other two conditions (though not significantly higher). Thus, 
there appears to be a slight tendency for those in the sad mood condition to have reported 
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riskier cognitions and behavior prior to the laboratory session. Consistent with this tendency, 
and also not significant, virgins were less likely to be in the sad condition (n = 2) than the 
other two conditions (ns > 6), χ2 (2) = 4.43, p = .11. Chi-square analyses were conducted on 
the demographic variables taken during the mass-testing sessions. Gender, ethnicity, and 
marital/relationship status were all evenly distributed across the three conditions.  
Mood Induction 
 The 10 mood adjectives were combined into a single index. The mean mood score for 
each condition was as follows (with higher values indicating a more positive mood state): sad 
M = 2.86 (SD = 0.71, 95% CI: 2.63-3.09), neutral M = 3.82 (SD = 0.52, 95% CI: 3.63-4.00), 
and happy M = 4.24 (SD = 0.49; 95% CI: 4.08-4.40); the one-way ANOVA was significant, 
F(2, 107) = 55.11, p < .001. The mean for each condition was significantly different from the 
other two conditions (ps < .008). The mood induction thus appeared to have been successful. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Outcome expectancies. The negative outcome expectancies were more highly 
endorsed than the positive expectancies (ts > 7.58, ps < .001). The most common negative 
outcomes that “came to mind” were pregnancy, contracting an STD, and difficulties in 
establishing a real relationship with the partner (see top half of Table 2). These negative 
outcomes were also rated the most important. The three most common positive outcomes that 
came to mind were physical pleasure, enjoyment of giving partner pleasure, and feeling sexy 
(see bottom half of Table 2). These were also the top three positive outcomes in terms of 
importance. Not surprisingly, the two endorsements (“did this go through your mind?” and 
“would this be important to you?”) were highly correlated for both the negative and positive 
outcome expectancies (both rs = .73, p < .001).   Endorsements of negative outcome 
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expectancies were significantly inversely related to endorsements of positive outcome 
expectancies (rs < -.21, p < .03), with one exception (Negative and Positive “come to mind” 
were unrelated, r = -.06, NS). The reaction times for the negative outcome endorsements and 
the two positive endorsements were positively correlated (rs > .22, ps < .02). Likewise, the 
reaction time for reading the expectancies was also associated with the endorsement reaction 
times (rs > .19, ps < .05).  
 Exploratory factor analysis was conducted on each endorsement index using principal 
components extraction and an oblique rotation (see Tables 3 & 4). For the negative “come to 
mind” items, three factors emerged. The following items loaded onto the first factor: not 
wanting to be seen as someone who sleeps around, would feel sinful, would feel bad (cheap, 
dirty) afterwards, and not liking spur of the moment activities; the second factor consisted of 
two items: not wanting to make a bad impression on the other person and difficulty in 
establishing a real relationship with the partner. Finally, the third factor had two items, 
worries regarding pregnancy and STDs. A review of these factors suggests that the third 
factor taps into the primary health-related negative consequences (pregnancy and STDs), 
whereas the second factor taps into consequences focusing around the partner (creating a bad 
impression, chance of future relationship). The first factor appears to be a “catch-all” for the 
remaining negative consequences, which primarily focus on non-health related individual 
reasons (e.g., feed bad afterwards, sinful). For the factor analysis on the importance of these 
items, two factors emerged. All the items loaded onto the first factor, with the exception of 
pregnancy and STDs, which loaded onto the second factor. Unexpectedly, the two types of 
endorsements revealed different factor structures. 
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Table 2. Individual Negative and Positive Outcome Expectancy Ms and SDs 
 Did this go through your mind? 
Would this be 
important to you? 
Negative Outcome Expectancies M SD M SD 
     
I would NOT have sex because…     
I don't want to get (a girl) pregnant. I'm too young 
for that kind of responsibility. 2.62 0.70 2.85 0.47 
I would be afraid of getting a sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) like herpes, or worse, HIV.  2.50 0.82 2.84 0.41 
It would be hard to establish a "real" relationship 
with this person in the future. If I like him/her, I'd 
wait. 
2.49 0.77 2.50 0.59 
I don't want the other person to get the impression 
that I often have sex with someone I've just met. 2.19 0.92 2.30 0.73 
I don't want to be seen as someone who sleeps 
around. I'm not that type of person.  2.03 0.95 2.17 0.86 
I would feel bad afterwards. It would make me 
feel cheap or dirty.  1.73 0.87 1.86 0.75 
I would feel sinful, as it goes against my personal 
morals and religious beliefs. I was not raised to act 
like this. 
1.62 0.86 1.71 0.72 
I don't like to do things on the spur of the moment. 
I prefer things to be more planned. 1.35 0.64 1.45 0.64 
     
Positive Outcome Expectancies     
I would have sex because…     
I would greatly enjoy the physical pleasure (e.g., 
achieving an orgasm). 2.04 0.89 1.96 0.71 
It would give me pleasure to give my partner an 
orgasm. I enjoy making my partner happy. 1.83 0.92 2.14 0.74 
It would make me feel sexy (attractive) to be 
desired by someone I don't know well. 1.61 0.82 1.61 0.68 
It would make me feel good about myself. I'd feel 
like a better person (boost my self-esteem). 1.52 0.75 1.52 0.62 
It would be a great stress reliever. Having sex 
would help me to relax. 1.47 0.79 1.53 0.65 
It would strengthen our relationship by increasing 
the attraction we feel toward each other and 
cementing the bond we have. 
1.47 0.73 1.50 0.62 
It would distract me from all the things I was 
currently worried about (for example, money, 
studying). 
1.40 0.71 1.42 0.60 
It would help my reputation, and improve my 
standing among my peers. 1.28 0.61 1.21 0.43 
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 Table 3.Negative Outcome Expectancy Endorsement Factors 
  Come to Mind  Important 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3  Factor 1 Factor 2 
I would NOT have sex 
because… 
      
 I don't want to get (a girl) 
pregnant. I'm too young 
for that kind of 
responsibility. 
  .701   .777 
 I would be afraid of 
getting a sexually 
transmitted disease 
(STD) like herpes, or 
worse, HIV.  
  .799   .702 
 It would be hard to 
establish a "real" 
relationship with this 
person in the future. If I 
like him/her, I'd wait. 
 .878   .620  
 I don't want the other 
person to get the 
impression that I often 
have sex with someone 
I've just met. 
 .772   .778  
 I don't want to be seen as 
someone who sleeps 
around. I'm not that type 
of person.  
.536    .823  
 I would feel bad 
afterwards. It would 
make me feel cheap or 
dirty.  
.624    .685  
 I would feel sinful, as it 
goes against my personal 
morals and religious 
beliefs. I was not raised 
to act like this. 
.587    .682  
 I don't like to do things 
on the spur of the 
moment. I prefer things 
to be more planned. 
.769    .494  
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Table 4. Positive Outcome Expectancy Endorsement Factors 
  Come to Mind  Important 
  Factor 1 Factor 2  Factor 1 
I would have sex because…     
 I would greatly enjoy the 
physical pleasure (e.g., achieving 
an orgasm). 
.509   .714 
 It would give me pleasure to give 
my partner an orgasm. I enjoy 
making my partner happy. 
.706   .628 
 It would make me feel sexy 
(attractive) to be desired by 
someone I don't know well. 
.565   .695 
 It would make me feel good 
about myself. I'd feel like a 
better person (boost my self-
esteem). 
.785   .688 
 It would be a great stress 
reliever. Having sex would help 
me to relax. 
 .511  .652 
 It would strengthen our 
relationship by increasing the 
attraction we feel toward each 
other and cementing the bond we 
have. 
 .819  .441 
 It would distract me from all the 
things I was currently worried 
about (for example, money, 
studying). 
 .742  .569 
 It would help my reputation, and 
improve my standing among my 
peers. 
.852   .601 
      
 
 For the positive outcome expectancies, two factors emerged for the “come to mind” 
endorsements. It would make me feel sexy, raise self-esteem, improve reputation, physical 
pleasure, and pleasuring partner all loaded onto the first factor. The second factor consisted 
of strengthening the relationship, stress relief, and distraction from stressors. The first factor 
appears to a “catch-all” that taps into the most popular positive consequences. The second 
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factor has both a stress relief component (distraction from worries, stress reliever) as well as 
relationship component (strengthen relationship). A one-factor solution was found for the 
positive importance endorsements. 
 Additional experimental measures. For Ms, SDs, and correlations for all of the 
experimental measures, see Table 5. Participants reported being at least somewhat willing to 
engage in sex with a casual partner without using a condom (M = 4.55, SD = 1.28 on a 7-pt. 
scale). As expected, average BI/BE was lower, with M = 2.46 (SD = 1.19).  
Participants’ perceived prototype favorability was 3.76 (SD = 0.75) and their perceived 
vulnerability was 5.30 (SD = 1.08), both on 7-pt. scales. All of the items were correlated, 
with BW, BI/BE, and prototype being positively correlated with each other. PV was 
negatively correlated with BW, BI/BE, and prototype. The same pattern of associations was 
found with the outcome expectancy endorsements, as BW, BI/BE, and prototype were 
positively correlated with endorsement of positive outcome expectancies (rs > .25, ps < .008) 
and negatively correlated with endorsement of negative outcome expectancies (rs < -.23, ps < 
.02); PV was inversely related to the positive outcome endorsements (rs < -.21, ps < .03) and 
positively associated with negative outcome endorsements (rs > .24, ps < .01). The lone 
exception to this pattern was the correlation between BI/BE and negative “come to mind” 
endorsement, which was in the same direction but did not reach significance (r = -.12, NS).  
 
37 
 
Table 5. Correlations, Ms, and SDs for Primary Measures  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
             
1 Neg exp. 
mind 
           
2    Factor 1 .86           
3    Factor 2 .72 .43          
4    Factor 3 .31 -.04 -.03         
5 Neg exp. 
import. 
.73 .77 .51 -.06        
6    Factor 1 .73 .81 .54 -.14 .98       
7    Factor 2 .17+ .07 .01 .34 .37 .16+      
8 Pos exp.  
mind 
-.06 -.14 -.11 .23* -.21* -.23** .05     
9    Factor 1 -.08 -.17+ -.11 .25** -.26* -.23* .08 .94    
10    Factor 2 -.01 -.04 -.07 .11 -.16 -.16+ -.02 .79 .52   
11 Pos exp. 
important 
-.29** -.36 -.21* .12 -.31 -.34 .04 .73 .73 .51  
12 Neg exp. 
read RT 
-.02 .01 -.10 .04 .06 .04 .13 .13 .12 .11 .05 
13 Neg exp. 
mind RT 
-.05 .05 -.09 -.13 .01 .06 -.19* -.04 -.06 .03 -.03 
14 Neg exp. 
import RT 
-.07 .03 -.05 -.19* .09 .10 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.08 -.01 
15 Pos exp. 
read RT 
-.05 -.05 -.09 .07 -.05 -.07 .08 .08 .07 .07 .07 
16 Pos exp. 
mind RT 
-.08 -.12 -.06 .09 -.19* .16+ -.15 .14 .14 .10 .16+ 
17 Pos exp. 
import RT 
-.05 -.01 -.06 -.06 -.02 -.01 -.07 -.01 .03 -.07 .03 
18 BW -.36 -.47 -.29** .25** -.46 -.52 .06 .38 .42 .17+ .53 
19 BI/BE -.12 -.19* .01 .03 -.28** -.28** -.05 .27** .28** .16+ .37 
20 PV .24** .21* .12 .13 .35 .33 .19* -.21* -.19* -.16+ -.24** 
21 Prototype -.23** -.24** -.21* .08 -.34 -.35 -.05 .25** .29** .12 .38 
22 MT BW -.35 -.44 -.27** .20* -.45 -.50 .06 .37 .39 .21* .51 
23 MT BI/BE -.17+ -.28** -.01 .06 -.35 -.36 -.06 .22* .21* .16+ .31 
             
 M 2.07 1.68 2.34 2.56 2.21 2.00 2.85 1.58 1.66 1.45 1.62 
 SD 0.42 0.57 0.73 0.58 0.39 0.50 0.34 0.50 0.58 0.55 0.40 
 Scale 
Range 
1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 
             
Note: N = 109 or 110. All bolded correlations are sig. p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < 
.10; Neg = Negative, Pos = Positive; exp. = expectancy, mind = would this come to mind, 
import = would this be important to you, RT = response time, BW = behavioral willingness, 
BI/BE = behavioral intentions and expectations, PV = perceptions of vulnerability. 
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Table 5. Correlations, Ms, and SDs for Primary Measures (Continued) 
  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
              
1 Neg exp. 
mind 
            
2    Factor 1             
3    Factor 2             
4    Factor 3             
5 Neg exp. 
import. 
            
6    Factor 1             
7    Factor 2             
8 Pos exp.  
mind 
            
9    Factor 1             
10    Factor 2             
11 Pos exp. 
important 
            
12 Neg exp. 
read RT 
            
13 Neg exp. 
mind RT 
.25            
14 Neg exp. 
import RT 
.35 .56           
15 Pos exp. 
read RT 
.80 .19* .23*          
16 Pos exp. 
mind RT 
.30 .50 .29*
* 
.41         
17 Pos exp. 
import RT 
.35 .38 .60 .38 .64        
18 BW -.09 .03 -.05 .07 .19* -.01       
19 BI/BE .00 -.07 -.02 -.01 .04 .02 .27**      
20 PV -.07 .00 .02 -.14 -.27** -.14 -.26** -.47     
21 Proto .21* .07 .01 .26** .31 .16+ .33 .15 -.34    
22 MT BW .08 -.13 -.04 .12 .08 .03 .66 .37 -.25** .38   
23 MT 
BI/BE 
.00 -.05 -.01 .08 .16+ .06 .36 .50 -.27** .22* .48  
              
 M 8.52 7.64 7.29 8.49 7.59 7.36 4.55 2.46 5.30 3.76 0.69 0.25 
 SD 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.24 0.31 0.48 1.28 1.19 1.08 0.75 0.65 0.85 
 Scale 
Range 
7.99
-
9.07 
6.90
-
8.63 
6.32
-
8.33 
7.99-
9.13 
6.98-
8.37 
6.01-
8.50 
1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 -0.68-
1.91  
-0.72-
2.84 
              
Note: N = 109 or 110. For the reaction times, the ranges are reported instead of the scale 
range. All bolded correlations are sig. p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10; Neg = 
Negative, Pos = Positive; exp. = expectancy, mind = would this come to mind, import = 
would this be important to you, RT = response time, BW = behavioral willingness, BI/BE = 
behavioral intentions and expectations, PV = perceptions of vulnerability. 
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Examining the correlations among the endorsement factors discussed earlier and the 
experimental cognition measures showed a similar pattern, with one notable exception. 
Having the outcomes of pregnancy and STDs come to mind (factor 3) was positively 
correlated with BW, r = .25, p = .009. The other two factors for negative “come to mind” 
were significantly inversely related to BW (rs < -.29, ps < .002), as would be expected. 
Interestingly, factor 3 was not associated with BI/BE, r = .03, NS. Finally, the reaction times 
for the outcome expectancies were generally unassociated with responses to the BW, BI/BE, 
prototype, and PV measures. Again, there were a few exceptions: reaction time for the 
positive “come to mind” endorsement was positively correlated with BW (r =.19, p = .04) 
and prototype (r = .31, p > .001), and negatively correlated with PV (r = -.27, p = .004). 
These findings suggest that people who were faster at responding whether or not positive 
outcomes came to mind (i.e., lower reaction times) later reported lower BW and prototype 
favorability, and higher levels of perceived risk. 
It is interesting to note a general tendency for the correlations between the 
endorsement items and BW were stronger than the correlations between the endorsement 
items and BI/BE. In the case of negative outcome expectancy endorsements, many of the 
differences in correlations reached significance: (a) BW/Negative outcome expectancy 
“come to mind” r = -.36, BI/BE/Negative outcome expectancy “come to mind” r = -.12, t = 
2.22, p = .03; (b) BW/Negative outcome expectancy “come to mind” factor 1 r = -.47, 
BI/BE/ Negative outcome expectancy “come to mind” factor 1 r = -.19, t = 2.79, p < .01 ; (c) 
BW/Negative outcome expectancy “come to mind” factor 2 r = -.29, BI/BE/Negative 
outcome expectancy “come to mind” factor 2 r = .01, t = 2.66, p < .01 ; and (d) BW/Negative 
outcome expectancy “important” factor 1 r = -.52, BI/BE/Negative outcome expectancy 
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“important” factor 1 r = -.28, t = 2.35, p = .02.Thus, higher levels of BW are associated with 
less consideration of negative consequences of engaging in the behavior. Although BI/BE 
was also negatively correlated with endorsement of negative outcome expectancies, the 
associations were significantly weaker. This pattern is consistent with the prototype model 
as, relative to intentions, willingness involves little precontemplation of the behavior or its 
consequences (Gerrard et al., 2002; Gerrard et al., 2008; Gibbons, Gerrard, Ouellette, & 
Burzette, 1998). These findings lend support to the idea that BW and BI are separate 
constructs. 
Mass-testing items. The average (standardized) scores for both BW and BI/BE taken 
during the mass-testing sessions were positive (Ms = 0.69 and 0.25, respectively). Thus, the 
sample had higher than average BW compared to their peers (in the mass-testing sessions) 
and slightly higher BI/BE. The modal response on the number of sexual partners’ in one’s 
lifetime was one partner, though the mean was close to three partners. BW and BI/BE were 
positively correlated (r = .48, p < .001). These measures were also positively associated with 
BW and BI/BE assessed during the experimental session (mass-testing BW/experimental 
BW: r = .68, p < .001; mass-testing BI/BE, experimental BI/BE, r = .50, p < .001). Those in 
the high BW/high BI group had significantly higher levels of both BI/BE and BW than the 
high BW/low BI group (BI: t = 12.51, p < .001; BW: t = 2.82, p = .006). Table 6 shows the 
Ms and SDs for BW and BI/BE in each of the six cells. In addition, those in the high 
BW/high BI group had significantly more previous sexual partners than the high BW/low BI 
group (t = 3.13, p = .002). Of some concern, there was a significant difference in MT BW for 
those in the sad mood conditions, with those in the high BW/high BI group having higher 
scores than those in the high BW/low BI conditions (t = 2.01, p = .05). Ideally, these two  
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Table 6. Means and SDs for Experimental and Mass-Testing BW and BI BE 
 Item  Happy  Sad  Neutral 
    
High BW / Low BI    
 Experimental BW  4.35 (1.27)  4.46 (1.30)  4.14 (1.45) 
 Experimental BI/BE  1.53 (0.68)a  2.11 (0.65)a  2.18 (1.53) 
 Mass-Testing BW   0.39 (0.61)  0.67 (0.62)b  0.49 (0.63) 
 Mass-Testing BI/BE  -0.42 (0.27)a -0.32 (0.28)a -0.49 (0.23)a 
High BW / High BI    
 Experimental BW  4.93 (1.10)  5.11 (1.11)  4.21 (1.30) 
 Experimental BI/BE  2.92 (0.88)  3.34 (1.45)  2.66 (0.92) 
 Mass-Testing BW  0.77 (0.71)  1.08 (0.53)  0.75 (0.66) 
 Mass-Testing BI/BE  0.81 (0.78)  1.13 (0.69)  0.79 (0.68) 
     
Note. Experimental BW and BI/BE were on 1-7 scales (BW: M = 4.55, SD = 1.28; BI/BE: M 
= 2.46, SD = 1.19), Mass-Testing BW and BI/BE were the means of z-scores (BW: M = 0.69, 
SD = 0.65; BI/BE: M = 0.25, SD = 0.85). Superscripts indicate significant differences 
between the High BW/Low BI and High BW/High BI groups: a ts > 3.74, ps < .001, b t = 
2.01, p = .05 
 
groups would differ only on their prior BI and not BW. The differences in MT BW were not 
significant, however, for the high vs. low MT BI groups in the other two mood conditions.   
 Gender differences. Females tended to be less risk-taking in their responses compared 
to males (e.g., lower BW in both mass-testing session and in the laboratory, higher levels of 
endorsement of negative outcome expectancies). Therefore, gender was controlled for in all 
of the following analyses.3   
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Comparison of Responses to Positive vs. Negative Outcome Expectancies 
 To test the first two hypotheses, that endorsement and reading/response time for the 
positive vs. negative outcome expectancies would differ as a function of mood condition and 
prior BI/BE, repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on each of the five expectancy-
related dependent measures (with the within-participant variable being valence of items: 
positive or negative; see Table 7). For these analyses, mass-testing BI/BE was dichotomized 
using a median split. It is important to keep in mind that all participants were selected based 
on their higher-than-average levels of willingness, and therefore the mass-testing BI/BE 
factor is comparing the high BW/low BI and high BW/high BI groups.  
 Endorsements. For the first Mood Condition x Mass-testing BI/BE x Measure 
Valence repeated-measures ANOVA on participants’ endorsement of whether the outcome 
expectancies came to mind, none of the between-participants’ effects reached significance 
(Fs < 1.68). There was a main effect for valence, such that negative outcome expectancies 
were more likely to come to mind than positive expectancies (F = 57.41, p < .001); this effect 
was qualified by a Valence x Gender interaction (F = 15.44, p < .001), with this difference in 
endorsement of positive vs. negative endorsements being greater for females than for males. 
   The repeated-measures ANOVA for the importance ratings of the positive and 
negative outcome expectancies showed similar valence (F = 92.98, p < .001) and Valence x 
Gender effects (Fs > 19.53, ps < .001). In addition, there was a significant main effect for 
prior BI/BE (F = 4.12, p = .045) qualified by an interaction with valence (F = 7.95, p = .006). 
Low BI/BE participants were more likely to endorse negative outcome expectancies as being 
important and less likely to endorse the importance of positive expectancies compared to  
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Table 7 Adjusted Ms and Significant Effects for Repeated-Measures ANOVAS 
  Low BI/BE (in MT)  High BI/BE (in MT)  
  Happy Sad Neutral  Happy Sad Neutral Sig. Effects 
Come to mind?        
 Positive Outcome 
Expectancies 
1.58 1.55 1.42  1.53 1.71 1.67 
ME Valence (p < .001) 
MT BI/BE x Valence 
(p < .10) 
 Negative 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
2.19 2.10 2.04  1.97 2.01 2.08  
          
Important to you?        
 Positive Outcome 
Expectancies 
1.55 1.66 1.53  1.63 1.83 1.48 
 Negative 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
2.42 2.32 2.26  2.02 2.09 2.16 
ME Valence (p < .001) 
ME MT BI/BE (p < 
.05) 
ME Mood (p = .09) 
MT BI/BE x Valence 
(p = .006) 
          
RT Read expectancy        
 Positive Outcome 
Expectancies 
5.59 5.57 5.60  5.60 5.47 5.60 
 Negative 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
5.48 5.43 5.42  5.40 5.31 5.48 
ME Mood (p = .08) 
          
RT Come to mind?        
 Positive Outcome 
Expectancies 
4.67 4.80 4.62  4.91 4.78 4.83 
MT Bi/BE x Valence 
(p < .05) 
 Negative 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
4.73 4.78 4.51  4.63 4.70 4.65  
          
RT Important to 
you? 
       
 Positive Outcome 
Expectancies 
4.55 4.75 4.44  4.68 4.58 4.72 
 Negative 
Outcome 
Expectancies 
4.43 4.60 4.34  4.34 4.32 4.36 
MT BI/BE x Valence 
(p = .03) 
MT BI/BE x Mood (p 
= .07) 
          
 
 
those with higher BI/BE. There was also a marginally significant main effect for mood 
condition (F = 2.43, p = .09); collapsing across valence, the estimated marginal means were 
1.97 for those in the sad condition, 1.90 for those in the happy condition, and 1.86 in the 
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neutral condition. Participants in the sad condition rated more outcome expectancies as being 
important than those in either the happy or neutral mood conditions.  
 Reaction times. There were three reaction time repeated-measures ANOVAs 
conducted. The first for the time it took to read the outcome expectancy and click next, the 
second measured the time to respond to whether it came to mind, and finally the third 
measured the time to report how important it was. All of these analyses controlled for 
baseline reading and response time and differences in average word length between the 
positive and negative outcome expectancies. Those who responded quickly at baseline or 
were female were faster at reading the outcome expectancy and clicking next, as shown by 
significant main effects for baseline reaction time and gender (Fs > 8.23, ps < .005). There 
was also a marginally significant main effect for mood condition (F = 2.54, p = .08); 
collapsing across outcome expectancy valence, the estimated marginal means were lower for 
those in the sad mood condition (M = 5.44) than for those in either the happy (M = 5.51) or 
neutral (M = 5.53) conditions. 
 With respect to the “come to mind” reaction time repeated-measures ANOVA, only 
two effects reached significance: baseline response time main effect (F = 28.41, p < .001) 
and a BI/BE x valence interaction (F = 3.98, p < .05). Those with low prior BI/BE spent 
roughly the same amount of time reading and responding to the positive and negative 
outcome expectancies (M = 4.70 for positive outcome expectancies, M = 4.67 for negative), 
whereas those with higher prior BI/BE spent more time on the positive outcome expectancies 
(M = 4.84) compared to the negative outcome expectancies (M = 4.66). The positive 
outcomes either appealed to the high BI/BE participants (they spent longer re-reading them) 
and/or they spent longer deciding whether these outcomes had come to mind. Reaction times 
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tended to be longer for participants who responded with “Maybe.” Separate ANOVAs were 
run to determine whether participants differed in how often they answered “Maybe” (2 on a 
3-pt scale) as a function of their mood and prior BI. No significant differences were found, as 
neither mood nor mass-testing BI/BE (or their interaction) were related to how often 
participants’ responded with a “Maybe.” 
 Finally, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the time it took participants 
to read the positive or negative outcome expectancy (for the third time) and respond to 
whether or not it was important to them. Again, the baseline reaction time had a significant 
main effect (F = 22.38, p < .001). As with the “come to mind” reaction time, there was a 
significant BI/BE x Valence interaction (F = 4.98, p = .03) and the estimated marginal means 
showed the same pattern. The difference in reaction times for the positive and negative 
outcome expectancies was smaller for those with low BI/BE (positive: M = 4.58, negative: M 
= 4.46), than for those with high BI/BE (positive M = 4.66; negative: M = 4.34). There was a 
marginally-significant interaction between mood condition and BI/BE (F = 2.78, p = .07). 
For those in the happy condition, the response time was similar for high and low BI/BE 
participants (Ms = 4.49 vs. 4.51); for those in the sad mood condition, those with lower 
BI/BE took longer to respond than those with high BI/BE (Ms = 4.68 vs. 4.45, respectively). 
Finally, for participants in the neutral mood condition, those with lower BI/BE responded 
more quickly than those with high BI/BE (Ms = 4.39 vs. 4.54, respectively).  
 Negative Outcome Expectancies 
 Endorsements. To further examine the repeated-measures ANOVAs, separate 
analyses were run for the positive and negative outcome expectancies. To improve statistical 
power, regression analyses were used and prior BI/BE was left as a continuous measure 
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rather than being dichotomized. Mood condition was dummy-coded such that D1 was coded 
as 1 = happy condition, 0 = sad and neutral mood conditions and D2 equaled 1 for the sad 
condition and 0 for the other conditions; thus, the neutral condition was used as the 
comparison group in all of the regressions. For each regression, the dependent variable was 
regressed on gender, prior BI/BE, D1, D2, D1 x BI/BE, and D2 x BI/BE (and also baseline 
response time for the reaction time regressions; see Table 8). For the negative “come to 
mind” endorsements, the only significant effect was for gender. For the full index, factor 1, 
and factor 2, females reported that the negative outcomes came more frequently to their mind 
than the males; the reverse was found for factor 3 (which consisted of the pregnancy and 
STDs items), with males reporting these items came to mind more frequently. The lack of 
any mood effects and any interactions with prior BI/BE is inconsistent with the expected 
findings (Hypotheses 1 and 2). 
For the negative importance endorsement, there was again an effect for gender, but 
also a marginal mood (D1) by condition main effect (β = -.22, t = -1.62, p = .108). This effect 
suggests that those in the happy mood condition with high BI/BE were less likely to report 
negative outcomes as being important. To look more carefully into this interaction, 
regressions were run using the factors as the dependent variables. For the factor two 
(pregnancy and STDs) regression, only D1 was significant (β = -.24, t = -2.01, p < .05)—
those in the happy mood were less likely to view pregnancy and STDs as being important to 
them than those in the neutral mood condition. However, both males and females rated these 
outcomes as being equally important. For the regression predicting factor 1 (everything 
except pregnancy and STDs), the gender effect was significant (p < .001) and there was a 
marginally significant D1 x BI/BE interaction (β= -.25, t = -1.93, p = .057). For these six 
47 
 
Table 8 Regressing Negative Outcome Expectancy DVS on Predictors 
 Gender Baseline 
RT 
Mood 
D1 
Mood 
D2 
MT 
BI/BE 
MT 
BI/BE x 
D1 
MT 
BI/BE x 
D2 
        
Come to Mind -.29**       
        
Come to Mind 
Factor 1 
-.37***       
        
Come to Mind 
Factor 2 
-.27**       
        
Come to Mind 
Factor 3 
.22*       
        
Important -.30***     -.22+  
        
Important 
Factor 1 
-.35***     -.25+  
        
Important 
Factor 2 
  -.24*     
        
RT Read 
Expectancy 
.20* .55***    -.23+  
        
RT Come to 
Mind 
 .35***  .25*    
        
RT Important  .29**  .30**   -.26+ 
        
Note: Table shows βs. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, + p < .11. Gender: 0 = Female, 1 = 
Male; D1: 1 = Happy, 0 = Sad, Neutral; D2: 1 = Sad, 0 = Happy, Neutral 
 
negative outcome expectancies, females rated them as being more important than males and 
those in the happy mood condition with higher BI/BE rated them as being less important. 
These results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 1b, which predicted that there would be no 
difference in endorsement of the negative outcome expectancies based on mood. Also, it was 
predicted that any mood effects would be stronger for those with lower levels of prior BI/BE 
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(Hypotheses 2)—this was not the case. In contrast, it was those participants who already had 
high levels of BI/BE who were influenced by being in a happy mood. 
Reaction times. Mood effects were found in every reaction time regression related to 
negative outcome expectancies. First, the time it took to initially read the outcome 
expectancy and click “next” was predicted. There were significant effects for baseline 
reaction time and gender (those with faster baseline times, or were female, were faster at 
reading the negative outcome expectancy). There was also an interaction between D1 x 
BI/BE, though it failed to reach significance (β= -.23, t = -1.92, p = .057). The pattern was 
that reading times were faster for those higher in BI/BE who were in the happy mood 
condition. Note that before it was found that this same group also reported six of the negative 
outcomes (factor 1) as being less important to them. This suggests that those in the happy 
mood, to some extent, were more dismissive of the negative outcomes. This is consistent 
with the idea that this group should be the most interested in maintaining their current 
(happy) mood state. A second regression was done predicting the time it took participants to 
read the outcome expectancy and respond to the “come to mind” question. Again, those with 
faster baseline times were quicker to respond to these items. In addition, there was a 
significant effect of D2 (β = 0.25, t = 2.28, p = .03). In this case, those in the sad mood 
condition spent more time responding than those in the other conditions. Finally, the time it 
took participants to read and respond to the importance question was examined. Baseline 
response time was again a significant predictor. In addition, there was a significant main 
effect for D2 (β = 0.30, t = 2.70, p = .008) and a marginal D2 x BI/BE interaction (β = -0.26, 
t = -1.74, p = .085). The main effect shows that, as with the “come to mind” question, those 
in the sad mood condition took longer to read and respond to the measure of importance for 
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the negative outcome expectancies. The marginal interaction suggests that this effect was 
slightly stronger for those higher in BI/BE. The slower time for those in the sad conditions, 
were not due to any differences in how often participants’ responded with “Maybe.”  
Positive Outcome Expectancies 
Endorsements. Parallel regression analyses were done on the positive outcome 
expectancy measures (see Table 9). Gender was the only significant predictor of whether a 
positive outcome came to mind, such that males were more likely to have had these positive 
outcomes come to mind. Overall, the positive expectancies came to mind just as often for the 
different mood conditions and different BI/BE levels. As an aside, when only factor 2 of 
“come to mind” (stress relief, distraction, strengthen relationship) was entered as the 
dependent variable, there was significant effect of prior BI/BE (β = 0.43, t = 2.36, p = .02) 
and a marginal interaction between D1 and BI/BE (β = -.26, t = -1.79, p = .076). These 
positive factors came to mind more often for those with higher BI/BE, though among those 
high in BI in the happy mood condition there was a tendency for them to be less likely to 
come to mind. With respect to whether or not the positive outcomes were important to them, 
the two significant predictors were gender and D2 (β = 0.23, t = 2.07, p = .04). Thus, males 
and those in the sad mood conditions were more likely to say that the positive outcomes were 
important to them. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1a, though it is not consistent 
with Hypothesis 2 (that the effect would be moderated by prior BI/BE). Recall, that a one-
factor solution was found for the negative outcome importance measures, so this suggests 
that the mood effect was similar across the various positive outcome expectancies. 
 
 
50 
 
Table 9 Regressing Positive Outcome Expectancy DVS on Predictors 
 Gender Baseline 
RT 
Mood 
D1 
Mood 
D2 
MT 
BI/BE 
MT 
BI/BE x 
D1 
MT 
BI/BE x 
D2 
        
Come to Mind .21*    .31+   
        
Come to Mind 
Factor 1 
.26**       
        
Come to Mind 
Factor 2 
    .43* -.26+  
        
Important .22*   .23*    
        
RT Read 
Expectancy 
.23** .57***      
        
RT Come to 
Mind 
 .43***      
        
RT Important  .36***     -.25+ 
        
Note: Table shows βs. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, + p < .10. Gender: 0 = Female, 1 = 
Male; D1: 1 = Happy, 0 = Sad, Neutral; D2: 1 = Sad, 0 = Happy, Neutral 
 
Reaction times. Baseline response time and gender significantly predicted the amount 
of time it took for participants to read the positive expectancies and click “next.” Males and 
those with slower baseline response times were slower to read the positive outcome 
expectancies. There were no significant effects for either mood or BI/BE. Likewise, the only 
significant predictor of the reaction time for “come to mind” was baseline reaction time. 
Finally, baseline reaction time was also a significant predictor of the time it took to respond 
to the importance measure. In addition, though, there was a marginally significant 
interaction, D2 x BI/BE (β = -.25, t = -1.70, p = .09). The pattern suggests that those in the 
sad mood condition and high in BI/BE were faster in responding. In general, however, the 
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findings with respect to reaction times related to positive outcome expectancies were 
inconsistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Effects on Other Experimental Measures 
 Although it was not clear how long the mood manipulation would last (or how mood 
would be influenced by the outcome expectancies), the experimental BW, BI/BE, PV, and 
prototype measures, that followed the outcome expectancy measures, were regressed on 
gender, mood, BI/BE, and the Mood x BI/BE interaction terms. The willingness items came 
immediately after the expectancy items and were therefore expected to be more likely to 
show an effect of mood. When controlling for mass-testing BW, there was a significant effect 
of D1 (β = .18, t = 2.09, p = .04). In addition, gender and mass-testing BW were significant 
predictors. The mood effect showed that those in the happy mood condition reported higher 
BW, which is opposite to what was expected. It is interesting to note that when mass-testing 
BW was not controlled for in the model, D2 became marginally significant such that those in 
the sad mood condition reported higher BW (which would be consistent with the expected 
findings). 
 The experimental BI/BE measure also showed significant mood effects. In this case, 
the two interactions were significant, D1 x BI/BE (β = 0.25, t = 1.98, p = .05); D2 x BI/BE β 
= 0.30, t = 2.24, p < .03). The first interaction shows that the experimental BI/BE was higher 
for those in the happy condition who had higher prior levels of BI/BE; the latter interaction 
shows that those with higher levels of prior BI/BE in the sad condition also had higher 
experimental BI/BE. Thus, it appears that higher levels of prior BI/BE were related to more 
experimental BI/BE, except for those in the neutral mood condition. As BI/BE is typically 
positively correlated with BW, it was expected that sad mood may predict higher BI/BE; in 
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addition, previous correlational research (Pomery, 2008a) has shown that happy moods are 
related to higher sex BE. Therefore, the current findings are not completely unexpected. A 
Mood Condition x Prior BI/BE x Measure repeated-measures ANOVA was run on 
experimental BW and BI/BE to see how similar the effects were for the two measures. With 
respect to within-participant effects, the following were significant: measure, Measure x 
Gender, and Measure x Prior BI/BE (all ps < .008). Experimental BW was higher than 
experimental BI/BE, and this difference was stronger for males than for females (as females 
tended to be low on both). Not surprisingly, the difference in experimental BI/BE (low prior 
BI/BE M = 1.94, high prior BI/BE M = 2.98) between the two groups was larger than the 
difference in the experimental BW measure (Ms = 4.38 and 4.68, respectively). In addition, 
gender, condition, and prior BI/BE all showed significant main effects (ps < .05). Males, 
those in the sad condition, and/or those with higher prior levels of BI/BE reported higher 
scores on the combined experimental measures (BW and BI/BE). This significant mood 
effect is consistent with predictions, in that it was those in the sad mood condition that 
reported the riskier health cognitions. In addition, the Condition x Prior BI/BE was 
marginally significant (p = .108): for those in the happy and sad condition, those with higher 
prior BI/BE reported higher experimental BW and BI/BE (happy M = 3.93, sad M = 4.17) 
compared to those in the neutral condition (M = 3.40); for those with lower levels of prior 
BI/BE, those in the sad condition reported the lowest scores (M = 2.89) followed by those in 
the neutral condition (M = 3.21) and those in the happy condition reported the highest 
experimental cognitions (M = 3.38).   
With respect to the other experimental cognition measures, PV and prototype 
favorability, regression analyses found that gender was the only predictor (significantly so 
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for prototype, marginally so for PV). Males were likely to report higher prototype 
favorability ratings and lower PV than females. These gender effects were expected. There 
were no mood effects, possibly suggesting that the mood manipulation had worn off by the 
time participants reached these measures. As PV and prototype were not measured in each 
mass-testing session, it was not possible to control for prior levels of these two cognitions. It 
is possible that after controlling for prior levels, mood may have explained a significant part 
of the unexplained variance that was left over. 
DISCUSSION 
Overview of Hypotheses and Primary Findings 
Hypotheses. The goal of the study was to examine the influence of a positive, 
negative, and neutral affective state on endorsement of and response time to positive and 
negative outcome expectancies. In addition, the influence of these affective states on 
willingness, intentions, perceived vulnerability, and prototype favorability was also 
investigated. It was hypothesized that those in the negative mood condition would more 
strongly endorse the positive outcome expectancies, as they would be motivated to improve 
their current mood state. In contrast, participants in the happy mood condition were expected 
to have lower levels of endorsement for the positive outcome expectancies, although they 
may be attracted to the like-valenced items and spend longer time reading them (Bower, 
1981; Dalgliesh, 2003). In addition, it was hypothesized that the effects of the induced mood 
states would be moderated by prior level of BW and BI, with those “at risk” (high BW/low 
BI) showing stronger mood effects than those more committed to the risky behavior (high 
BW/high BI). 
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Mood effects. Contrary to expectations, no effects of mood were found on the 
endorsement of outcome expectancies in any of the repeated-measures analyses. As the mood 
induction was successful, it is unlikely that a problem with the induction was an issue. When 
examining only the negative outcome expectancies, there were significant effects of mood on 
the “Would this be important to you?” item, though not as predicted. The negative outcome 
expectancies received the highest importance ratings from those who were in the happy 
mood condition and were higher in mass-testing BI/BE (a potential explanation for this 
finding is described later). There were few effects of mood on the positive outcome 
expectancy items.  
With respect to the response time measures, some interesting findings emerged, as 
there were either significant or marginal effects found for the three negative reaction time 
measures and one for the positive outcome expectancy reaction time measures (importance). 
Those in the happy mood condition with higher levels of prior BI/BE were quicker at reading 
the negative outcome expectancies; those in the sad condition took longer to report whether 
these expectancies either came to mind or were important to them. Those with higher prior 
BI/BE in the sad mood condition were quicker in responding whether the positive outcome 
expectancies were important to them. It is interesting to note that mood effects were found 
more consistently for the importance measure, as this question always followed the “Did this 
come to mind?” item which was less likely to show any effects of mood.  
Comparing groups. Not surprisingly, those in the high BW/high BI group (the 
“intenders”) showed greater endorsement of the positive outcome expectancies and lower 
endorsement of the negative outcome expectancies. Since they have likely engaged in the 
behavior in the past, and plan to do so in the future, focusing on the positive consequences 
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(and less on the negative consequences) facilitates the reduction in any dissonance that may 
be experienced. Contrary to predictions, however, when interactions were found, it was the 
high BW/high BI group that showed the stronger mood effects (“the intenders”).  
Reconciling Findings with the Mood Literature 
 The hypotheses were based on previous findings that people in negative mood states 
tend to act in a more risk-taking manner than those in happy mood states, as explained by the 
motivation mood theories. However, as noted in the introduction, the literature has also 
consistently found that those in sad moods tend to think more systematically and more in-
depth than those in  happier mood states who have been found to use shallower levels of 
processing and be more likely to use simple heuristics in their decision-making. It is risky to 
make conclusions about level of processing from the reaction time findings, however there is 
at least some evidence from the current study to support these findings. For example, those in 
the sad mood condition took longer to report on whether the negative outcome expectancies 
either came to mind or were important to them. This suggests that those in the sad mood 
condition may have been thinking more in-depth than those in the happy condition. It did not 
appear that those in the sad mood condition were just more indecisive, in that they were no 
more likely to respond with a “Maybe” than the other mood conditions. The faster times of 
those in the happy mood condition lends support for the idea that the negative outcome 
expectancies were being processed in a shallower manner by this group (at least for those 
with higher levels of mass-testing BI/BW).  
 The influence of mood states on risky sexual cognitions and outcome expectancies 
are also likely influenced by the type of behavior. The scenario and measures in the study 
were specific to casual partners. It is likely that the effects of mood on sexual cognitions and 
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behavior differ when considering sex with a steady partner. Gender differences and the role 
of past behavior also come into play when comparing sexual behavior with casual vs. steady 
partners. Future research should examine these issues in more detail. 
Reconciling Findings with PWM 
 As before (e.g., Pomery, 2004), mood was shown to influence risk cognitions 
(specifically, BW and to a slightly lesser extent, BI/BE).  It is the case that these cognitions, 
especially BW, are more labile for the “at-risk non-intenders,” however, this is not 
necessarily inconsistent with our findings with respect to outcome expectancy endorsements. 
These individuals, in theory, are more influenced by elements of the social reaction path and 
contextual factors. Outcome expectancies, on the other hand, are often considered part of the 
reasoned pathway that is common in expectancy-value theories; in making a rational 
decision, it is logical that one would consider the potential consequences of one’s actions. It 
may be the case that mood does not have a strong effect on more reasoned or logical 
decision-making, but rather on the more experiential, heuristic, and less analytic processing 
style described in dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999). That is to say, rather 
than influencing any of the factors that are influential in more rational decision-making, 
mood states may affect people’s gut reactions to decisions.   
 In addition to being “at-risk,” it is also possible to conceive that those in the high 
BW/low BI group were ambivalent toward the behavior. They likely held both favorable and 
unfavorable attitudes regarding casual sex. The high BW/high BI group can be 
conceptualized as those who hold stronger, and more favorable, opinions of the behavior. 
Research has shown that those with stronger attitudes are more likely to prefer attitude-
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consistent information (Brannon, Tagler, & Eagly, 2007). The role of attitude ambivalence 
and selective exposure among these groups should be further explored in future research. 
The Role of Dissonance 
 It was found that, in general, those in the high BW/high BI group more strongly 
endorsed the positive outcome expectancies and less strongly endorsed the negative outcome 
expectancies than those in the high BW/low BI group. In retrospect, this is not surprising 
given the potential cognitive dissonance that may have been experienced by this group. The 
high BW/high BI group is, in theory, more committed to engaging in the behavior; however, 
they realize the negative implications of doing so (as shown by the fact that the negative  
outcome expectancies were equally likely to come to mind for this group as the high BW/low 
BI group). The circumstances are such that this group is particularly likely to experience 
dissonance: they are committed to the behavior, they are aware of the potential negative 
consequences, and they were not forced into any of their prior actions or decisions (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1996). As a result, the high BW/high BI group needs a way to reduce this 
cognitive tension. One of the classic ways of doing so is through changing cognitions 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). By increasing the importance of positive outcomes, they are 
adding consonant cognitions, adding support for why they are committed to the risky 
behavior. By minimizing the importance of the negative outcomes, they are also able to 
decrease dissonance. All participants were exposed to both positive and negative outcome 
expectancies. They were not able to select which ones they read or responded to. However, 
the amount of time they spent doing this was not set by the experimenter. Although by no 
means was it a consistent pattern, there were occasions when the times were quicker for the 
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negative outcome expectancies for those higher in mass-testing BI. This group may have 
been answering more quickly in an attempt to dismiss the potential risks.  
Alternatively, there is also a non-dissonance explanation for these findings: 
specifically, those in the high BW/high BI group may have been acting in accordance with 
their past attitudes and beliefs. For example, rather than increasing the importance rating of 
positive outcome expectancies because of dissonance caused by the awareness of their past 
behavior, they may have simply held these beliefs prior to engaging in any risky behavior.  It 
should be noted that these two explanations (behavior influencing changes in attitude and 
attitudes influencing future behavior) are not mutually exclusive, however. Future studies 
should investigate these effects further.  
Implications  
Although not a focus of the study, there were interesting findings with respect to the 
factor structures of the outcome expectancy endorsement items. For example, the structures 
differed for the “come to mind” and “importance” items. In addition, worries about 
contracting STDs or of a possible pregnancy were related (and both were commonly 
endorsed, both in terms of frequency of coming to mind and in importance to the 
participants). In one case, the factor containing these two items was positively correlated 
with the experimental BW index—opposite to both expectations and the pattern shown by 
the other negative outcome expectancy factors, which were inversely related to BW. STDs 
and pregnancies are the more common negative outcomes that are stressed by public health 
officials and sex educators, and in advertisements for condoms and other types of birth 
control. It may be that participants thought this was what they were expected to think about 
when given the scenario. In any case, these items were highly endorsed, even by those who 
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reported higher levels of BW. This is disconcerting in the fact that even though these young 
adults thought about and realized the importance of these negative outcomes, it did not lower 
their willingness to engage in risky sexual behavior. This adds support for the consistent 
finding that education alone is not an effective prevention tool. 
Advantages and Limitations of Study 
 This study was unique in that all affective states were experimentally induced 
(including neutral mood). In addition, it is the first study to examine potential mediators of 
the affective states Æ BW relation (in this case, positive and negative expectations). To 
avoid having participants bias their own results by self-correcting for their perceived 
influence of mood, as explained by the Flexible Correction Model, Wegener & Petty, 2001), 
the general purpose of the study was disguised. Finally, the pre-testing during mass-testing 
sessions allowed for participants to be selected based on their prior levels of BW and BI/BE. 
Therefore, it was possible to compare different groups, namely the high BW/low BI group 
and the high BW/high BI group. 
 Although the study had many advantageous aspects, there are also some limitations 
that are worthy of discussion. First, the small sample size did not allow for much statistical 
power in testing for the hypothesized effects. Combined with the fact that the effect sizes 
were smaller than anticipated, it made it harder to detect hypothesized effects, especially 
interactions. Due to the lower rate of accrual during Spring 2008, participants who had taken 
part in other mass-testing sessions (Fall 2007 mass-testing, Spring 2008 scale validation, and 
Summer 2008 mass-testing) eventually were also recruited. This was not ideal in that there 
was a large discrepancy in the amount of time that had passed since participants had 
completed the mass-testing measures. In addition, the mass-testing sessions from which their 
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prior BW, BI/BE and behavior were assessed, did not include all of the items assessed during 
the Spring 2008 mass-testing session. For example, during the Fall 2007 mass-testing 
session, there were only two BI/BE items—both related to casual sex, but neither mentioned 
that a condom was not available. There were also differences in the BW measures assessed. 
For Fall 2007, there was only one BW scenario and it made no mention of whether or not a 
condom was available. In addition, the question assessing how often participants typically 
had a condom with them when they attend parties or go to a bar was not assessed and could 
not be controlled for. In an effort to deal with this issue, BW and BI/BE items were 
standardized within their specific mass-testing cohort and then averaged to form the mass-
testing indices for both BW and BI/BE. 
 The lack of identical pre-testing measures for each participant makes it more difficult 
to assess their BW and BI/BE and determine whether they should be classified as either high 
BW/low BI or high BW/high BI. Thus, there is likely a larger amount of variation among the 
two groups than would be desired, and as a result some participants may have been 
misclassified. Ideally, the criteria for recruitment would have been identical for each 
participant, which would lessen the likelihood of any classification issues. When pre-
selecting groups based on high or low BI/BE scores in mass-testing, regression to the mean is 
a concern during the experimental session. It may be that participants’ true BI/BE scores are 
closer to the group mean, and thus those selected with higher BI/BE scores in mass-testing 
may report lower scores during the mass-testing session (and those with lower BI/BE scores 
in mass-testing may report higher scores during the experiment). This narrowing of the 
difference in BI/BE between the two groups can limit the effect size of group differences, 
leading to less power in the analyses. 
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 There were also some limitations with the experimental procedure that may have 
influenced the findings. For example, participants were asked to think about the casual sex 
BW scenario for 3 minutes before being exposed to the outcome expectancy statements and 
questions. Some participants reported that this was too long, as they knew immediately what 
they would do, based on previous experience in similar situation. It is hard to know what the 
ideal time is, as participants should have enough time to think carefully about the scenario, 
but not to the extent where they become distracted or bored. It is likely that the ideal amount 
of time varies from participant to participant, based on factors such as need for cognition. A 
small number of participants reported that they were confused by what was meant by “casual 
sex” (one reported that at first he thought it meant having intercourse with one’s serious 
partner, but in a casual manner). Thus, the phrase should have been repeatedly defined 
throughout the experiment. 
An additional issue with the experiment was that mood was only assessed once 
(following the guided imagery mood induction). Although assessing mood at different times 
during the experimental session would have allowed for change in mood to be examined, 
inclusion of additional mood measures would have created additional problems. For 
example, if mood was measured following the expectancy items, it may have influenced 
participants’ BW and it also would not be clear if any change of mood is a result of the 
positive or negative outcome expectancies (or both). If mood was measured following the 
BW scenario, it would be unclear whether mood changed as a result of either exposure to the 
positive or negative outcome expectancies or to the BW measures. Therefore, the decision 
was made to only include one mood assessment.  
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 As with other laboratory studies, the external validity of the findings may be 
questioned. In daily life, when faced with a tempting situation such as the casual sex scenario 
described, it is unlikely that young adults take 3 minutes to think about what they are going 
to do. Also, as noted earlier, the participants may not represent the ideal “intenders” or “at-
risk non-intenders’ (high BW/high BI or high BW/low BI), due to issues with the mass-
testing measures. This also limits the ability to generalize the findings. 
Future Directions 
 Many of the limitations addressed earlier should be able to be addressed with future 
research. For example, larger samples can be used where identical selection criteria are 
applied. One way to potentially limit the issues surrounding multiple mood measurements 
would be to use implicit mood measures (Philippot, 1993). Although these tend to be less 
reliable than self-report items, it would avoid having participants’ awareness of their current 
affective state influencing their responses to later measures.  
 In order to better examine the role of outcome expectancies, and more generally type 
of processing, in the mood – BW association, it would be useful to experimentally 
manipulate these items and examine the impact these manipulations have on the effects of 
mood on BW. For example, participants could be instructed beforehand to focus on either the 
positive or negative outcome expectancies; alternatively, participants could be instructed to 
think about it carefully (inducing a more reasoned processing style) or to go with their gut 
reaction (inducing a more experiential processing style). The influence that happy and sad 
mood states have on BW could then be examined across conditions. It has been suggested 
that the best way to investigate mediational constructs is to treat them as moderators in an 
experimental design (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). 
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 With a larger sample, the additional power would allow for testing of moderating 
variables, such as need for cognition and gender. It may be that the hypothesized effects are 
true for only a portion of the sample. Also, additional mediators of the affect Æ BW relation 
should be examined. It may be the case that mood influences individuals’ BW in a less 
intuitive manner. As previous PWM studies have shown, the social reaction pathway in the 
model is known for its lack of rational thinking. It may be that mood does not influence the 
components of logical decision-making (e.g., perceived consequences). In any case, 
replication of the current study should lead to more definitive conclusions and better identify 
avenues for future research that can be used to inform prevention programs aimed at 
adolescents and young adults. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Behavioral expectations assesses how likely one is to engage in a behavior (i.e., do 
you expect to engage in a behavior in a certain time frame; Warshaw & Davis, 1985). 
Although related, one may expect to engage in a behavior but not plan or intend to do it (e.g., 
exceed the speed limit, prevaricate; Pomery et al., 2008). 
2 Originally, it was planned that only one mass-testing session would be sufficient to 
recruit the sample for the current study. In order to increase the sample size, participants 
were recruited from other sessions. As a result some of the measures varied slightly across 
mass-testing sessions. 
3 The primary analyses were repeated using only male participants (N = 78), and the 
general pattern of findings remained consistent. For example, with the “come to mind” 
measure, valence remained significant (p < .000) and the Valence x MT BI/BE interaction 
became significant (from p = .097 to p = .03). Again, negative outcome expectancies were 
more likely to come to mind than positive outcome expectancies; participants with higher Mt 
BI/BE were more likely than those with low MT BI/BE to have positive outcome 
expectancies come to mind (and slightly less likely to have negative outcome expectancies 
come to mind). A similar pattern was found with the “important” measure, as there were 
significant valence and Valence x MT BI/BE effects (ps < .005); the effect of mood condition 
remained marginal (p = .07), and Valence x Mood condition became marginal (p = .08; those 
in the sad mood were more likely to rate the positive outcome expectancies as being 
important compared to the other two mood conditions; there was no difference across 
conditions for the negative outcome expectancies). Thus, there is some suggestion that the 
effects of the mood induction on endorsements strengthens a little when excluding females 
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from analyses. Excluding females from the analyses of the reading and response times 
resulted in fewer and less clear-cut changes. 
In addition, the repeated-measures ANOVAS were also conducted using gender as a 
factor and not as a control variable. The pattern of findings was similar for the two 
endorsement measures. For the reaction time measures, some new interaction effects 
emerged. For example, there was a significant Gender x Mood condition x MT BI/BE 
interaction for the time it took to read each outcome expectancy (p = .04), and a Gender x 
Condition (p = .05) interaction for time to respond to the “come to mind” measure. The 3-
way interaction is difficult to interpret; the Gender x Condition effect is such that males took 
longer to respond in the sad mood condition compared to the other two mood conditions, 
whereas females took longer to respond in the happy mood condition compared to the other 
two mood conditions.   However, with as few as 3 participants per cell, drawing conclusions 
from these analyses is not advisable.   
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APPENDIX A 
Mass-Testing Items 
For all questions, casual sex defined as sex with someone you don’t know very well 
 
Note: MT = Mass-testing, SV = Scale Validation 
 
Behavioral Willingness 
 
Spring 2008 MT, Spring 2008 SV, Summer 2008 MT 
Suppose you were at a party and met a man/woman for the first time. You think that 
he/she is attractive, and the two of you get along very well. At the end of the evening, 
you go to his/her apartment with him/her. You’re feeling as if you might like to have sex 
with him/her and he/she obviously feels the same way. Neither of you has a condom. 
How willing would you be to do each of the following: (1 = not at all willing, 4 = maybe, 
7 = very willing) 
1. Stay at his/her apartment and have oral sex. 
2. Stay at his/her apartment and have sex. 
3. Stay at his apartment, but don’t have sex. (throwaway item) 
 
Fall 2007 MT, Spring 2008 MT, Summer 2008 MT 
Suppose you were at a party and met a man/woman for the first time. You think that 
he/she is attractive, and the two of you get along very well. At the end of the evening, 
you go to his/her apartment with him/her. You’re feeling as if you might like to have sex 
with him/her and he/she obviously feels the same way. How willing would you be to do 
each of the following: (1 = not at all willing, 4 = maybe, 7 = very willing) 
4. Stay at his/her apartment and have oral sex. 
5. Stay at his/her apartment and have sex. 
6. Stay at his apartment, but don’t have sex. (throwaway item) 
 
 
Behavioral Intentions/Expectations 
 
1. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have casual sex?  (1 = definitely not, 4 = 
maybe, 7 = definitely)—Fall 2007 MT, Spring 2008 MT, Spring 2008 SV, Summer 
2008 SV 
2. In the next 6 months how likely is it that you will have casual sex? (1 = not at all 
likely, 4 = maybe, 7 = very likely).—Fall 2007 MT, Spring 2008 MT, Summer MT 
3. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have sex without a condom? (1 = definitely 
not, 4 = maybe, 7 = definitely)—Spring 2008 MT, Spring 2008 SV, Summer 2008 
MT 
4. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have casual sex without a condom? (1 = 
definitely not, 4 = maybe, 7 = definitely)—Spring 2008 MT, Spring 2008 SV 
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Past Behavior 
 
1. How many people have you had sexual intercourse with in your lifetime? (1 = none, 2 
= 1, 3 = 2, 4 = 3, 5 = 4, 6 = 5, 7 = 6-7, 8 = 8-9, 9 = 10-11, 10 =12 or more)—Fall 
2007 MT, Spring 2008 MT, Spring 2008 SV, Summer 2008 MT 
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APPENDIX B 
Experimental Risk Cognition Measures 
Behavioral Willingness 
Suppose you were single and not seriously dating anyone. You've had your eye on 
someone in one of your classes. He/she invites you to a party at his/her apartment, and 
you accept. During the party you quickly become engrossed in conversation, and 
immediately feel a connection with this person. It is obvious that you are both attracted to 
each other. The party is winding down, and eventually everyone leaves. You continue to 
talk with this person. Neither of you has a condom. How willing would you be to do each 
of the following: (1 = not at all willing, 4 = maybe, 7 = very willing) 
1. Stay at his/her apartment and have oral sex. 
2. Stay at his/her apartment and have sex. 
3. Stay at his apartment, but don’t have sex. (throwaway item) 
 
Suppose you were single and not seriously dating anyone. Your roommate is going out 
with his/her girl/boyfriend, and asks you to come along, as his/her roommate is tagging 
along. You don't know this person very well, but decide to join them anyway. During the 
group outing, you and the other roommate hit if off and have an immediate connection. 
Your roommate and his/her date eventually leave for a party, and you end up alone at 
your place with this person. You continue to talk, and the topics become more personal. 
Neither of you has a condom. How willing would you be to do each of the following: (1 
= not at all willing, 4 = maybe, 7 = very willing) 
 
1. Have oral sex. 
2. Have sex. 
3. Continue talking, but don’t have sex. (throwaway item) 
 
Perceived Vulnerability 
1. If you were to have casual sex, without a condom, how vulnerable do you think you 
would be to the negative consequences of casual sex (e.g., sexually transmitted 
disease)? (1 = Not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = very much) 
2. How risky (or dangerous) do you think it is to have casual sex without a condom? (1 
= Not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = very much) 
 
Behavioral Intentions/Expectations 
1. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have casual sex?  (1 = definitely not, 4 = 
maybe, 7 = definitely) 
2. In the next 6 months how likely is it that you will have casual sex? (1 = not at all 
likely, 4 = maybe, 7 = very likely). 
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3. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have sex without a condom? (1 = definitely 
not, 4 = maybe, 7 = definitely) 
4. In the next 6 months, how likely is it that you will have sex without a condom? (1 = 
not at all likely, 4 = maybe, 7 = very likely). 
5. In the next 6 months, do you intend to have casual sex without a condom? (1 = 
definitely not, 4 = maybe, 7 = definitely) 
6. In the next 6 months, how likely is it that you will have sex without a condom? (1 = 
not at all likely, 4 = maybe, 7 = very likely). 
 
Prototype Image 
Now we'd like you to think about the type of person your age who has sex with a "casual" 
partner, (someone they don't know very well or who they just met), without using a condom. 
We are not suggesting that these people are always alike.  Rather, we are interested in what 
traits you think this type of person is likely to have (that is, what most people in this group 
are like). 
 
1.  How likely is this type of person to be Smart 
2.  How likely is this type of person to be Confused 
3.  How likely is this type of person to be Popular 
4.  How likely is this type of person to be Immature 
5.  How likely is this type of person to be "Cool" (sophisticated) 
6.  How likely is this type of person to be Self-confident 
7.  How likely is this type of person to be Independent 
8.  How likely is this type of person to be Careless 
9.  How likely is this type of person to be Unattractive 
10.  How likely is this type of person to be Dull (boring) 
11.  How likely is this type of person to be Considerate 
12.  How likely is this type of person to be Self-centered 
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 APPENDIX C 
 
Mass-Testing Willingness and Intention/Expectation Items by Session 
 
 Spring 
2008 MT 
(n = 77) 
Spring 
2008 SV 
(n = 11) 
Summer 
2008 MT 
(n = 2) 
Fall 2007 
MT 
(n = 22) 
     
BW items     
     
Scenario 1 (specifically mentions 
neither person has a condom) 
    
  BW oral sex 5.25 (1.53) 
0.93 (0.70) 
5.27 (1.49)
0.78 (0.67)
 2.00 (1.41) 
-0.05 (0.95) 
N/A 
  BW have sex 3.30 (1.78) 
0.52 (0.98) 
2.45 (1.81)
0.09 (1.11)
 1.00 (0.00) 
-0.47 (0.00) 
N/A 
     
Scenario 2 (no mention of condom 
availability) 
    
  BW oral sex 5.53 (1.29) 
0.90 (0.58) 
N/A  2.00 (1.41) 
-0.32 (0.70) 
 4.77 (1.60) 
 0.51 (0.70) 
  BW have sex 4.99 (1.69) 
0.82 (0.76) 
N/A  1.50 (0.71) 
-0.47 (0.36) 
 4.36 (1.68) 
 0.50 (0.75) 
     
BI/BE items     
     
Intend casual sex 3.09 (1.78) 
0.39 (0.97) 
3.27 (2.65)
0.47 (1.42)
 1.00 (0.00) 
-0.63 (0.00) 
 2.45 (2.06) 
 0.02 (1.05) 
Likely casual sex 2.87 (1.89) 
0.30 (1.03) 
N/A  1.00 (0.00) 
-0.56 (0.00) 
 2.05 (1.66) 
-0.16 (0.90) 
Intend sex without a condom 3.12 (2.29) 
0.33 (1.10) 
3.00 (2.41)
0.27 (1.20)
 4.00 (4.24) 
 0.82 (1.94) 
N/A 
Intend casual sex without a condom 1.84 (1.55) 
0.29 (1.30) 
1.82 (1.83)
0.24 (1.56)
N/A N/A 
     
Note. For each pair of rows, the top line refers to the raw Ms and SDs, the bottom rows are 
the Ms and SDs for the z-scores calculated within their mass-testing group; MT = mass-
testing, SV = scale validation; N/A = not applicable (item not measured) 
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APPENDIX D 
Outcome Expectancy Instructions and Items 
 
Prior to Expectancies 
 
Imagine the following situation for the next few minutes…Suppose you were single and not 
seriously dating anyone. You've had your eye on someone in one of your classes. He/she 
invites you to a party at his/her apartment, and you accept. During the party you quickly 
become engrossed in conversation, and immediately feel a connection with this person. It is 
obvious that you are both attracted to each other. The party is winding down, and eventually 
everyone leaves. You continue to talk with this person. Neither of you has a condom. Please 
think about this scenario, and try to imagine yourself in this situation. Think about how you 
might react. [Screen advances after 3 min.] 
 
Presentation of Expectancies 
 
People give a number of reasons why they would or wouldn't have sex with a casual partner 
(i.e., someone they don't know very well). Here are some responses that were given in a 
national poll of sexual behavior given to approximately 6500 young adults ages 20-25.  
We're interested in your reaction to the reasons they gave. Please read each statement and 
answer the two questions that follow. 
 
[Note expectancies presented in random order.] 
 
Negative Expectancies 
1.  I would NOT have sex because…I would feel bad afterwards. It would make me feel 
cheap or dirty.  
2.  I would NOT have sex because…It would be hard to establish a "real" relationship with 
this person in the future. If I like him/her, I'd wait. 
3.  I would NOT have sex because… I would be afraid of getting a sexually transmitted 
disease (STD) like  herpes, or worse, HIV.  
4.  I would NOT have sex because…I would feel sinful, as it goes against my personal 
morals and religious beliefs. I was not raised to act like this. 
5.  I would NOT have sex because…I don't want the other person to get the impression that I 
often have sex with someone I've just met. 
6.  I would NOT have sex because…I don't want to be seen as someone who sleeps around. 
I'm not that type of person.  
7.  I would NOT have sex because…I don't like to do things on the spur of the moment. I 
prefer things to be more planned. 
8.  I would NOT have sex because…I don't want to get (a girl) pregnant. I'm too young for 
that kind of responsibility. 
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Positive expectancies 
1.  I would have sex because…It would be a great stress reliever. Having sex would help me 
to relax. 
2.  I would have sex because…It would help my reputation, and improve my standing among 
my peers. 
3.  I would have sex because…It would make me feel good about myself. I'd feel like a better 
person (boost my self-esteem). 
4.  I would have sex because…It would make me feel sexy (attractive) to be desired by 
someone I don't know well. 
5.  I would have sex because…It would give me pleasure to give my partner an orgasm. I 
enjoy making my partner happy. 
6.  I would have sex because…It would strengthen our relationship by increasing the 
attraction we feel toward each other and cementing the bond we have. 
7.  I would have sex because…I would greatly enjoy the physical pleasure (e.g., achieving an 
orgasm). 
8.  I would have sex because…It would distract me from all the things I was currently 
worried about (for example, money, studying). 
 
For each outcome expectancy: 
a) Did this go through your mind? (no, maybe, yes) 
b) Would this be important to you? (not at all, somewhat, very) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Current Feelings 
 
Think for a minute about how you are feeling right now.  Then quickly respond to each item. 
 
 
Currently, I feel …. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
      not at all         a little      moderately       quite a bit       extremely 
 
 
 
1.  _____  Calm 
 
2.  _____  Discouraged 
 
3.  _____  Cheerful 
 
4.  _____  Discontent 
 
5.  _____  Energetic 
 
6.  _____  Unhappy 
 
7.  _____  Optimistic 
 
8.  _____  Secure 
 
9.  _____  Unenthusiastic 
 
10.  _____  Alert 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Guided Imagery Scenarios 
 
 
Happy 
Practice:  You watch your favorite sports team come from behind to win a big game. 
1.  You just got a new job, and it's even better than you expected. 
2.  You spend a day in the mountains: the air is clean and sharp, the day sunny, and you take 
a swim in a beautiful lake.   
3.  It's your birthday and friends throw you a terrific surprise party. 
4.  You get out of class or work early. It's a beautiful day and you and some friends go out for 
ice cream. 
5.  You wake up on a Saturday after a number of wintry-cold rainy days, and the temperature 
is well above average. 
 
Sad 
Practice:  You watch your favorite sports team blow a big lead and lose a big game. 
1.  A pet you were really fond of has died. 
2.  Your best friend just graduated or got married and is moving far away from you. 
3.  No one remembers your birthday. 
4.  You get out of class or work late and don't have time to hang out with your friends. 
5.  You wake up on a Saturday morning and it's a wintry-cold snowy day and you have to 
cancel events planned with friends.  
 
Neutral 
Practice: You listen to the news on the radio in the car. 
1.  You meet with other students to work on a group project for class. 
2.  Your cell phone rings between classes. 
3.  You arrive to an appointment a few minutes early and read a magazine in the waiting 
room. 
4.  You quickly skim through your e-mails before heading off to class in the morning. 
5.  You check the weather report and decide whether or not you will need a coat today. 
 
 
